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ARTICLES 
THE CURRENT LIFE INSURANCE CRISIS: HOW THE 
LAW SHOULD RESPOND 
KYLE D. LOGUE* 
Defend the Cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow. 
Isaiah 1:17 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a household consisting of a wife and husband 
with two small children. One of the spouses is the "primary 
earner" (in the sense of being the one who earns the most 
income); the other spouse is either the "secondary earner" or 
stays at home with the children. Assume further that the 
family, which is wholly dependent financially on the wages of 
the spouses or of the single primary earner, has enough income 
to cover the household's current expenses and to begin saving 
for the couple's retirement. They even make enough to set 
aside a little cash each year for the children's college fund, and 
are slowly saving to make a down payment on a house (or 
maybe they recently bought a house and are just beginning to 
make payments on the mortgage). Things are going well. Life 
is good. 
Then disaster strikes. The primary earner dies 
unexpectedly, either from a sudden illness or an accident. 
What happens to the surviving members of the family? Aside 
from the obvious grief and psychological trauma associated 
with such an event, what happens to them financially? Does 
their standard of living plummet, or are they able to maintain 
some semblance of continuity from their previous life to their 
new one? The answer depends largely on whether the 
household (typically the primary earner himself or herself) at 
some point had decided to buy life insurance on his or her life. 
If there is too little life insurance coverage, the family may be 
forced to change their lives drastically, abandoning the college 
·Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I appreciate helpful comments from 
participants at the 1999 Harvard Law SChool Seminar on Current Research in Tax 
Policy and the Michigan Law and Economics Workshop. 
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aspirations for their children and perhaps having to move to a 
smaller, less expensive home (or maybe giving up the hope of 
the newer, larger home for which they had been planning). 
Furthermore, the surviving spouse may be forced to take a 
second job or change careers or, if he or she had been a stay-at­
home spouse, to join the labor force and therefore alter 
drastically the family's plan for how the children would be 
raised. At the extreme, an inadequately insured household in 
such a situation would, despite the existence of social safety 
nets, be pushed into a state of profound and persistent 
poverty.1 
This hypothetical suggests the importance of thinking 
carefully about one's (and one's dependents') life insurance 
needs. Such thinking does not provide easy answers; rather, it 
only suggests more questions: Under what circumstances 
should a household buy life insurance? Clearly, the 
hypothetical household described above needs some 
protection, but whom else? On whose life should the policy be 
purchased? How much coverage is appropriate? What type of 
policy is best? The problem is that these are questions that 
most of us try to ignore most of the time. True enough, there 
may be a brief period in our lives when we give the idea of 
buying life insurance some sustained thought, such as when 
we get married or when we have our first child. We may even 
return to the topic, at least cursorily, each time we receive a 
cold call from a life insurance agent. Still, it seems safe to say 
that the vast majority of us, most of the time, try to put life­
insurance questions out of our minds. By contrast, however, 
we seem to be growing increasingly obsessed with our 
investment portfolios, whether they be held inside or outside 
our 401(k) or Roth IRA plans. And on-line stock trading has 
become all the rage, even (and perhaps especially) for the most 
unsophisticated investors. 
So why the reluctance to consider life insurance? The 
1 See, e.g., Michael D. Hurd & David A. Wise, The Wealth and Poverty of Widows: 
Assets Before and After the Husband's Death, in THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 177 
(David A. Wise ed., 1989) (discussing the high incidence of poverty among 
widows and exploring extent to which poverty status arises as direct result of 
death of husband); see also CHERYL D. RETZLOFF, LLIF, ACS, ET. AL 1998 SURVIVOR 
STUDY: THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF DEATH 5-18 Gudith R. Kulak, 1998) (In cases in 
which the primary earner dies as the result of an extended illness, it appears the 
resulting poverty (or reduction in living standards) is a function not oruy of 
inadequate life insurance coverage but also less than full health and disability 
insurance). 
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obvious answer is that thinking about life insurance is much 
less enjoyable than thinking about our investments. Life 
insurance planning, as with all estate planning, requires us to 
contemplate our own mortality; whereas, in contrast, thinking 
about lifetime savings-the money we stow away each month in 
savings accounts, mutual funds, or individual stocks-enables 
us to daydream about the exotic locations we will visit in our 
retirement or the fancy colleges our children will one day 
attend. Or maybe the problem is that most of us hate the 
process by which life insurance has traditionally been 
marketed, with face-to-face interrogations by earnest but 
sometimes overeager life insurance agents, followed by a 
special medical examination that might include blood and 
urine tests. The privacy concerns raised by such medical tests, 
especially when conducted by or for the benefit of insurance 
companies, increasingly have become a source of acute anxiety 
for many. In any event, the following assertion seems true: we 
generally regard the topic of life insurance, and the process by 
which is it purchased, to be unpleasant and best avoided when 
possible. 
That attitude, if pervasive, presents a profound problem. It 
raises the concern that those households that need life 
insurance most-for example, middle-income, wage-dependent 
households with small children-have too little coverage. More 
specifically, given the pervasively negative attitude towards 
the life insuring process, we should expect that a) too few 
households will buy life insurance on the lives of primary and 
secondary earners as well as on other members of the 
household, such as stay-at-home spouses, who provide 
substantial services; b) of those households that do buy life 
insurance, many will buy too little; and c) of those that buy 
enough coverage initially, many will fail to update their 
coverage to meet their changing needs. We would be right 
about these expectations. Recent empirical research on the 
subject suggests that there is widespread and substantial 
underconsumption of life insurance.2 According to the most 
2 Astonishingly little independent (that is, not industry-funded) research has 
been done on the question of life-insurance adequacy. For the most 
comprehensive ana sophisticated empirical study on the topic, see B. DOUGLAS 
BERNHEIM, ET AL., THE ADEQUACY OF LIFE INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HEALTH 
AND RETIREMENT SURVEY (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7372, 1999). Before that paper, the leading studies were a series ofarticles by 
Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, see Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff, The Adequacy of Life Insurance Purchases, 1 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 215 
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recent and most sophisticated study on the subject, fifty-five 
percent of households sampled were underinsured on the life 
of the primary earner, and twenty-one percent were 
underinsured on the life of the secondary eamer.3 These 
findings are consistent with findings of prior research, what 
little exists. 4 Yet none of these studies examines the adequacy 
of life insurance on the lives of nonwage-earning household 
members, such as stay-at-home spouses. All of this evidence of 
insurance inadequacy comes despite the fact that, in 1998 for 
example, the per-household average amount of life insurance 
(for those households who had some type of life insurance 
policy) was $165,800.5 That may seem like a lot of money, but 
it amounts to only 2.85 years worth of disposable income for 
the average household-not much for a young family, recently 
deprived of its primary or secondary earner, on which to live. 6 
Even if true, why is this a regulatory concern? Why should 
the law, or the government more generally, do anything in 
response to this problem? The reasons are straightforward. 
From the perspective of one concerned with maximizing 
overall "social welfare,"7 it can easily be shown that society is 
generally worse off when households fail to plan adequately 
for unexpected losses. As described in the hypothetical, 
underinsurance can produce involuntary reductions in 
standards of living, potentially below the poverty line in some 
cases. Note also that this concern with maximizing social 
welfare-and the worry that, with respect to life-insurance 
(1991) [Hereafter Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life Insurance]; see ALAN J. 
AUERBACH & LAURENCE]. KOTLIKOFF, LIFE INSURANCE INADEQUACY-EVIDENCE 
FROM A SAMPLE OF OLDER WIDOWS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 3765, 1991). [Hereafter Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Sample of Older 
Widows]; see Alan J. Averbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Life Insurance of the 
Elderly: Its Adequacy and Detenninants, WORK, HEALTH, AND INCOME AMONG THE 
ELDERLY 229 (Gary Burtless ed., 1987). As will be discussed more fully below, all 
of these studies find a substantial degree of underinsurance. These studies can 
be contrasted with the hundreds of studies of savings behavior and adequacy 
that have been conducted. 
3 Bernheim, et al., supra note 2, at 24. 
4 See sources supra note 2. 
5 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 12, TABLE 
1.6 (1998). In 1997, Americans paid $115 billion in premiums to life insurance 
companies. AMERICAN COUNOL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 64 
(1998). By the end of 1997, the total amount of life insurance in force was 
roughly $13.2 trillion. Id. at 2, table 1.1. 
6 Id. 
7 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Human Welfare, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 961 (2000) (arguing that public policy should be made solely on the 
basis of effects on individual welfare). 
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decision making, that goal is not achieved-is almost identical 
with the concern that is presented by the problem of 
insufficient retirement savings; that is, when households put 
aside too little of current earnings to fund their desired post­
retirement standard of living. The problem of undersaving, 
however, has been widely acknowledged and exhaustively 
studied. In fact, the whole point of all the various tax breaks 
for retirement savings (IRAs and qualified pension plans), 
indeed the main reason for the Social Security system, is to deal 
with the problem of undersavings.8 Underconsumption of life 
insurance presents a similar problem. 
It reasonably can be argued that the problem of 
underconsumption of life insurance potentially is of greater 
concern than the problem of inadequate retirement savings. 
Why so? Individuals who make retirement savings decisions 
are, after all, deciding not only about the financial future of 
their long-term dependents (and, by extension, their heirs) but 
also about their own financial futures. They are deciding what 
their standard of living will be as compared to their current 
standard of living 20, 30, or 40 years down the road. Although 
(as will be discussed further below) such a decision clearly 
presents myopia and over-optimism concerns, at least the 
decision maker is looking out for his or her own interests. With 
life insurance, things are different. The decision maker, 
typically the head of the household, is put in the position of 
looking out for the best interests of his or her dependents in 
some future, hypothetical state of the world, and one in which 
he or she (the insured, that is) will not be around to enjoy. 
Though altruism surely motivates many to make just such 
inter-temporal and state-dependent reallocations of resources, 
surely altruism for most people, in their everyday lives, still 
takes a backseat to self-interest. Put more concretely, when the 
decision is whether to allocate the next dollar to consumption 
today (a vacation, a new car, or a new stereo system today) or 
to consumption at some point in the future (a vacation, a new 
8 JULIA LYNN CORONADO, DON FULLERTON, & THOMAS GLASS, Long Rune Effects of 
Social Security Reform Proposals on Lifetime Progressivity (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7568), (Feb. 2000) There is, of course, a 
redistributive element to Social Security as well. The benefit formula is generally 
considered highly progressive. However, when the regressive Social Security tax 
is taken into account, as well as intergenerational and within household effects, 
the overall Social Security system is only mildly progressive. This fact suggests 
that the main reason for the system is forced savings. See id. 
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car, or a new stereo system some years down the road), though 
we are always worried about the tendency of the former to 
trump the latter, that tendency will be greatest when the person 
making the decision knows he or she will not be around to 
enjoy the future vacation, car, or stereo. 
Given these concerns, it is no surprise that our government 
has already done something about the tendency to 
underpurchase life insurance. The United States government 
already spends a substantial amount of public money on the 
life-insurance problem in the form of tax subsidies9 as well as 
direct payments to widows, widowers, and orphans of 
deceased workers in the form of Social Security survivorship 
benefits.10 However, those expenditures turn out to be 
inadequate. That is, all of the empirical studies that have 
examined the question have taken into account public 
expenditures on life insurance, and still there is widespread 
and substantial underinsurance. 
This article explores some of the issues raised by the new 
evidence of underinsurance. Part I explores the initial 
theoretical question: why do people buy life insurance? Put 
differently, what function does life insurance serve? Part II 
provides some background on the life insurance market as it 
currently exits. Thus, Part II summarizes the major types of life 
insurance that are currently offered and summarizes the main 
elements of the current regulatory regime for life insurance 
companies. Part III then provides support for the claim that 
households tend to drastically underconsume life insurance. 
Section A of that Part summarizes the existing empirical 
evidence, which finds substantial and widespread 
underinsurance. As I will point out, however, the scholars 
conducting those studies take pains to avoid reaching any 
normative conclusions based on their findings. In other words, 
9 The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that in 2001 alone, 
approximately $25 billion will be spent on federal income tax subsidies to 
encourage the private purchase of life insurance. Those subsidies consist of the 
income-tax exclusion for investment earnings on cash-value life insurance 
policies (an estimated $23 billion tax expenditure for 2001) and the exclusion for 
employer-provided group-term life insurance ( an estimated $2 billion tax 
expenditure). STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107th CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURF5 FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005, 18 Qoint Comm. Print 
2001). 
10 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105th CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK 15 (Comm. 
Print 1998) (describing the Old-Age, survivors, and disability Insurance (OASDI) 
programs) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. 
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although they do find substantial and widespread 
underinsurance, (almost paradoxically) they assert that such a 
finding does not imply that too little insurance is being bought. 
There is no paradox, however. The economists are simply 
demonstrating their awareness of the theoretical difficulty of 
specifying the "right" amount of life insurance coverage. 
Although it is impossible to answer that question definitively, 
in section B, this article favors a baseline that defines adequacy 
as that amount of life insurance necessary to maintain the 
survivors' standard of living, which happens to be the baseline 
that the researchers used in their empirical studies. That 
standard-of-living baseline will be controversial in some circles 
and, after a period of public debate, may be ultimately rejected. 
That outcome would be perfectly acceptable, so long as the 
debate takes place and households are forced to think seriously 
about what the right amount of life insurance is for their needs. 
Indeed, the main objective of this article is to start such a 
discussion. 
However, this article seeks to push the debate one step 
beyond the adequacy question. Therefore, Part N reviews a 
number of theoretical reasons why the economists' empirical 
evidence should be given a normative slant; that is, why the 
evidence should be interpreted as indicating a true 
underinsurance problem and why, therefore, further 
government intervention may indeed be appropriate. These 
"reasons to be worried" include the same sort of extemality 
and behavioral rationales that have been offered for 
government intervention in other contexts. 
Finally, Part N builds on Parts II and III and assumes the 
reader has been persuaded sufficiently of the existence of an 
underinsurance problem to consider what the possible policy 
responses might be. For those acquainted with the standard 
debates regarding the funding and administration of social 
insurance programs, this framework will be familiar. For 
example, Part N compares and contrasts the standard types of 
policy tools that are available to deal with this sort of problem, 
such as direct government provision, government mandates, or 
government subsidies. The purpose of Part N, which draws 
heavily from the existing literature on optimal subsidy design, 
is not to provide a comprehensive legislative proposal, but 
rather to sug.gest avenues of further inquiry. This Part 
concludes that a promising approach would involve either (a) a 
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combination of some minimal amount of government provided 
term insurance (along the lines of what is currently provided 
through Social Security survivorship benefits, although 
perhaps made more widely available and with somewhat more 
generous benefits) and a demand-side subsidy either in the 
form of a deduction, a credit, or a voucher, or (b) a more 
generous level of government-provided or government­
mandated coverage, but with the possibility for households to 
opt for less coverage. 
Part IV also looks at the existing tax-subsidies for life 
insurance-the exclusion for employer-provided term insurance 
and the exclusion for investment earnings in cash-value life 
insurance policies-and discusses how those rules might be 
expanded to enhance the existing subsidy for life insurance 
purchases. The most novel and potentially controversial 
suggestion in this Part is that, contrary to prior scholarly 
analyses of the tax treatment of cash value life insurance, a case 
can be made that, given the nature of the underinsurance 
problem, those rules should be expanded rather than repealed, 
as previous scholars have argued. 
I. THE FUNCTION OF LIFE INSURANCE 
A. The Demand for Insurance Generally 
Why do people buy life insurance in the first place? It is 
often said that the primary function of life insurance is to 
protect one party's pecuniary interest in the life of another, 
most often, to protect a family against the possibility of a 
breadwinner's premature death.11 Can more be said about this 
apparent need for economic security? Economists and 
psychologists have spent a great deal of effort over the years 
studying human decision-making under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty, and something (though not everything) can be 
learned from the insights their studies have produced. 
According to the standard economic account of insurance, 
the purchase of an insurance policy by an individual is merely 
one manifestation of a general characteristic of human nature: 
namely, people seem to be "risk averse," at least with respect to 
n See Kenneth Black, Jr. & Harrold D. Skipper, Jr. , Life Insurance 326-27 {12th 
ed. 1994); and Emmett J. Vaughan & Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk 
and Insurance 12-13 (1999). 
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the possibility of large losses of the sort that insurance policies 
typically cover. A risk averse party is someone who would 
rather experience a certain loss (that is, pay an insurance 
premium to an insurance company) than face an uncertain 
prospect of equal expected value (that is, not buy the insurance 
policy and take his chances).12 This observation has been 
formalized into the concave utility-of-income curve that is 
familiar to students of introductory microeconomics.13 The 
intuition underlying that concave curve is that, although 
individuals derive some utility from each new dollar received, 
they derive less utility with each succeeding dollar. In such 
situations, it could plausibly be argued that the relatively few 
dollars that go to pay the insurance premiums are "less 
costly" -less painful-for the individuals to lose (on a per­
expected-dollar basis) than the much larger number of dollars 
that would be lost in the event of an uninsured catastrophic 
loss. In a sense, the idea of risk aversion is that not all dollars 
are created equal: some of the dollars that go to pay an 
uninsured catastrophic loss would have otherwise gone to 
purchase "necessities," whereas all of the dollars that go to 
purchase insurance come "off the top."14 
In effect, then, an insurance policy can be understood as 
providing a means by which a risk averse individual transfers 
risk to an insurance company, which is assumed to be risk 
neutral (or at least less risk averse than the insured). When an 
individual purchases an insurance policy, she typically pays a 
certain premium (which approximates her expected loss for the 
period plus some loading charge) to the insurer, who agrees to 
12 Someone who is "risk preferring" would rather take the uncertain bet than the 
certain amount of equal expected value. The risk neutral party is indifferent 
between the two, caring orily about the expected value of the options. For 
accessible discussion of risk aversion and, more generally, the economic theory 
of risk and insurance, see, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 53-58 {1989); STEVEN SHA VELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT 
LAW186-205 (1987) . 
13 That standard economic account is based on the expected utility theory of Von 
Neumman and Morgenstern. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSfERN, 
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). 
t4 A similar rationale is used to justify redistributive taxation; that is, the policy of 
progressive taxation is sometimes defended by reference to a hypothetical 
concave social marginal-utility-of-income curve. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & 
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive 
Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1916-18 (1987) (explaining welfarist, ufilitarian 
defense of progressive tax system). 
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cover the loss in question if it occurs.15 Why is the insurer 
willing to do this? Why is the insurer not also risk averse? The 
answer lies largely in the concept of "risk pooling." The 
insurer collects similar premiums from numerous insureds 
whose risk characteristics are essentially the same (in other 
words, they pose the same ex ante estimated expected loss to 
the pool) but whose risks are uncorrelated with one another.16 
By pooling similar but independent risks in this way, the 
insurer benefits from the law of large numbers, which in this 
context says that the estimated loss payouts the insurer will 
have to make to insureds will approach the actual payouts as 
the size of the insurance pool increases.17 Thus, in effect, the 
sale of insurance policies by insurance companies to individual 
insureds has the welfare-enhancing effect of actually reducing 
societal risk.18 
H the standard (rational actor) economic model can tell us 
that risk averse individuals will want to buy insurance19 and 
that insurance companies can, through risk pooling, satisfy that 
demand, what can they tell us about how much insurance 
1s With "retrospective" commercial insurance, however, only a portion of the 
premium is certain. That is, the insured pays an initial premium at the beginning 
of the insurance period (typically one year). Then, at ilie end of the period, the 
premium is adjusted retrospectively to reflect the extent to which the loss 
experience of the insurance pool (of which the insured is a member) happened to 
diverge from what the insurer had predicted in setting the initial premium. 
Retrospective insurance, as with many types of coinsurance arrangement, 
amounts to a form of risk sharing between insured and insurer. 
16 Risk pooling does not work so well if all of the members of the pool are subject 
to the same risk-e.g., a hurricane insurance pool consisting entirely of houses in 
Key West. 
17 VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 11, at 15. "[B]y insuring a large number of 
insureds posing homogeneous and independent risks, an insurer can reduce the 
amount of variance in its expected losses to a very small range." KENNETH 5. 
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (3 ed. 2000). 
18 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort L«W, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521 (1987). Because there are limitations on insurers' ability to reduce risk 
through pooling, especially for potentially catastrophic losses, primary insurers 
often will reinsure some portion of their risks with secondary or" reinsurance" 
companies, so that the risl< pooling function can be taken to the next level. 
v AUGHAN & v AUGHAN, supra note 11, at 146. 
19 This is not to say, of course, that individuals who are risk averse with respect 
to the possibility of large losses will be risk averse with respect to small losses. 
For example, many people who buy insurance of various sorts against 
catastrophic losses also buy lottery tickets. This observation has even been 
formaliied. Applying the standard expected utility model, Friedman and Savage 
showed that a utility function which is concave at low levels of wealth and 
convex at high levels of wealth can explain why the same individual might buy 
both an insurance policy and a lottery ticket. Milton Friedman & Leonard J. 
Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948). 
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individuals will buy and what those policies will look like? 
That too is a question that economists have studied in depth, 
but no definitive answers have been reached, unless one is 
willing to make quite unrealistic assumptions about the state of 
the world. For example, according to the standard model, the 
purchase of "full" insurance coverage for a particular monetary 
loss-coverage with no deductibles or coinsurance or caps­
would be "rational," but only under a limited set of conditions, 
such as the absence of loading costs as well as moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Given, therefore, the 
prevalence of loading costs, moral hazard, and adverse 
selection, the standard models suggest that rational insurance 
policies would include something short of full coverage for 
monetary losses. 20 
An important refinement of the standard economic 
analysis of insurance demand takes into account the possibility 
that some events cause not only monetary losses (that is, losses 
for which there is a ready monetary equivalent) but also 
nonmonetary losses (that is, losses for which there is no ready 
monetary equivalent).21 For example, if an individual loses an 
arm or a leg or, worse, a child in an accident, that individual 
would obviously suffer a catastrophic nonmonetary loss as 
well whatever monetary losses may be associated with such 
tragedies. Indeed, in such cases, the nonmonetary loss will 
constitute the majority (in some instances all) of the actual 
harm.22 
Whether individuals demand insurance against the 
20 For example, applying the standard model, it has been shown that 1) if the 
insurer is risk averse (and hence charges a disproportionately large loading 
charge), the insured would prefer a policy that includes some element of 
coinsurance; and 2) if the insurer is risk neutral (so that the loading charge is 
proportional to the actuarial value of the risk), the insured would prefer a policy 
with full coverage over some deductible. KENNETH}. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE 
THEORY OF RISK BEARING (1971). 
21 In the literature, the terms "pecuniary" and "nonpecuniary" are often used to 
describe what I am calling monetary and nonmonetary losses. See generally 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and­
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (1995). 
22 With loss of a limb, medical expenses and possibly lost income would qualify 
as monetary losses; but there clearly would be a large nonmonetary element as 
well. That is, assuming he could get the money, the individual certainly would 
be willing to pay more than the dIScounted present value of the future earnings 
associatea with the limb to avoid the accident. With the loss of a child, no 
substantial monetary loss may in fact occur. Rather, the entire loss may be of a 
nonmonetary nature. Croley & Hanson, supra note 21, at 1884-85. 
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possibility of such nonmonetary harm is an interesting and 
difficult question. Applying a variant of the rational actor 
model, scholars have concluded that the answer turns on 
whether (and the extent to which) the event in question is 
expected to alter the individual's marginal utility of money.23 
On one hand, if the event is expected to have no effect on the 
individual's marginal-utility-of-money (that is, the next dollar 
in the "accident state of the world" is equal in value to the next 
dollar in the "no-accident state of the world"), the individual 
would ex ante demand full insurance against monetary losses 
(again, assuming no loading costs) but no insurance against 
nonmonetary losses. On the other hand, if the event is 
expected to increase the individual's marginal-utility-of-money 
(all else equal), she would demand more than full monetary­
loss insurance coverage. Finally, to complete the picture, if the 
event is expected to reduce the individual's marginal-utility-of­
money, less than full monetary-loss insurance would be 
demanded.24 
In sum, the standard economic theory of insurance tells us 
that rational but risk-averse individuals will demand insurance 
23 If an individual's utility function (the marginal utility of dollars) changes as a 
result of a particular type of event (here, a nonmonetary loss of some sort), that 
individual s utility function is said to be "state dependent." Philip J. Cook & 
Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of 
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. ECON. 143, 143-44 (1977). 
24 STEVEN SHA VELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 229-30 (1987). The 
scholars who have studied this question often develop simple hypothetical 
examples to illustrate the point. For example, one scholar offers the following 
illustration: 
Consider a business executive who runs recreationally and who loses a 
foot in an accident. ... [T]he injury could increase the marginal utility of 
money for this consumer if it caused her to substitute travel or the 
symphony for running because these activities are more expensive. 
Here marginal utility could fall, however, if she substitutes reading for 
running. 
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 
YALEL.J. 353, 364 (1988). Thus, in the former case, the executive would ex ante 
demand insurance for the loss of her foot in order to shift income (via the 
insurance premium) from the non-injured state of the world to the injured state 
of the world in which travel (which is an expensive pastime compared to 
running) has become relatively attractive; whereas, in the latter case, she would 
not demand insurance for the loss of her foot, but might in fact demand some 
form of" disinsurance" (for example, less than full medical insurance for 
amputation accidents) in order to keep more of her dollars in the non-injured 
state of the world where they are relatively valuable. For a discussion of the 
concept of, and a survey of the literature on disinsurance, see generally Croley & 
Hanson, supra note 21, at 1800 n.47. 
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to cover them against a possibility of harm; and the amount of 
coverage (the fraction of the total potential loss that will be 
covered) will be difficult to predict a priori. It will depend on, 
among other things, whether there are severe moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems (which suggest the rationality 
of less-than-full coverage) and the effect of the potential harm 
on the individual's marginal utility of money (which can go 
either way).25 
B. The Demand for Life Insurance 
The foregoing survey of the theory of consumer demand 
for insurance can, in one sense, be applied straightforwardly to 
the life-insurance context. At first blush, we can analogize the 
purchase of life insurance to the purchase of commercial 
property insurance, for example. Under this analogy, the 
insured (the person whose death will trigger the payment of 
the death benefit) is viewed as an income-generating asset, 
whether the income is in the form of wages (for a breadwinner­
insured) or household services (for a caregiver-insured). The 
value of this human asset can be understood as the discounted 
present value of all the insured' s expected future monetary and 
nonmonetary earnings (less the discounted present value of the 
insured' s expected lifetime consumption expenditures on 
himself or herself).26 Likewise, the analogue to the purchaser of 
property insurance (the one seeking to shift the risk of losing 
the asset from him- or herself to the insurer) would be the 
beneficiary of the life insurance policy. This is the person 
presumably who has a financial stake in the insured' s 
continuing to live his or her normal life span. 27 Therefore, if the 
25 In fact, the story is somewhat more complex than that. Recent experimental 
research in cognitive psychology has shown that human decision making 
sometimes exfiibits persistent and perplexing anomalies-features that would not 
be predicted by expected utility theory. For an accessible and lucid summary of 
the literature studying these phenomena in a range of decision-making settings, 
see RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: p ARADOXES AND ANOMAUF.S OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992). Some such anomalies have been documented in the 
context of insurance purchases. See, e.g., Eric C. Johnson, John Hershey, 
Jacqueline Meszaros, & Howard Kunreuther, Framins, Probability Distortions, and 
Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RrsK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993) (summarizing anecdotal 
evidence and experimental studies demonstrating how various well known 
heuristics and biases affect insurance purchasing decisions). 
26 BLACK AND SKIPPER, supra note 11 at 83. Personal consumption would include, 
in the context, amounts expected to be donated to charity or any individual or 
institution other than the dependent beneficiaries. 
v What is the precise nature of the "stake" that the dependent-beneficiary has in 
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beneficiary were risk averse, he or she would be willing to pay 
a premium to shift the risk of the insured's premature death to 
the insurance company.28 
This analogy to property insurance is almost perfect in 
situations involving the purchase of life insurance by one 
business partner on the life of another or by a company on the 
life of a "key employee."29 For example, the business partner 
who seeks to shift the risk of the other partner's premature 
death (and hence the loss of the valuable human capital that 
has been built up in that person) will purchase herself (or 
through the business on her behalf) the insurance policy on the 
other partner's life. The other partner may well return the 
favor.30 Perhaps a more common example of this type of life 
insurance is "key employee" insurance.31 With this type of life 
insurance, the employer seeks to protect itself against the loss 
of revenue (or the general disruption in business) that would 
result from the death of a particularly important employee, 
such as a top sales person or executive or, if the employer is a 
professional sports team, a star athlete. 
However, in the vastly more frequent life-insurance 
scenario, the policy is purchased on the life of the breadwinner 
in a household (and much less often on the life of a primary 
caregiver as well), and the beneficiaries of the policy are the 
members of that household who are dependent on the 
breadwinner's income (or caregiver's care). There the 
property-insurance analogy weakens and the analysis becomes 
the human capital of the insured? That is one of the difficult questions to which 
we will return below. 
28 Because everyone dies eventually and because most people stop being income­
generating assets around age 65 when they retire, the risk in question is whether 
the insurei:l will die prematurely or, more precisely, before the point at which the 
beneficiary is no longer dependent on the insured s income generating capacity. 
29 See generally_ MARK 5. DORFMAN & SAUL w. ADELMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 438-64 
(2d ed.) (1992) 
30 An interesting case involving life insurance purchased by business partners on 
each other is Ryan v. Tickle, 316 N.W.2d 580 (1982). There, two morticians went 
into the funeral home business together and took out life insurance policies on 
each other. When one of the partners died, the other sought to recover the 
proceeds of the policy. The legal issue was whether the widow of the deceased 
partner had standing to contest the beneficiary-partner's insurable interest. The 
court held that she cfid not. It has long been hefd that sole proprietors have an 
insurable interest in the lives of their partners. 
31 DORFMAN & ADELMAN, supra note 29 at 438-64. ("A key employee is defined as 
any person whose death or disability would cause severe financial harm to the 
organization, whether it is a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a 
corporation."). 
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more complex.32 For one thing, it is the breadwinner (not the 
beneficiaries) who generally purchases and maintains the life 
insurance policy on his or her own life. Further, in households 
with two earners, it is usually the primary earner who actually 
buys the life insurance, in the sense of being the contact person 
with the insurance agent.33 Of course, the biggest divergence 
from the property insurance analogy is that with life insurance, 
if the loss event occurs, the breadwinner-insured is no longer in 
the picture. The insured, therefore, is clearly not shifting any 
risk that he or she personally faces. The story is more complex 
than that. 
Because of these misguided analogies to the property­
insurance model, if we are to explain the breadwinner's (or 
primary earner's) decision to purchase life insurance (to agree 
to meet with the life insurance agent, have the physical exam, 
the blood test, and arrange to pay the premiums for the policy), 
we must adopt some theory of household economic decision­
making. That is, we must answer the question: how does the 
household decide to insure its breadwinner(s) or caregiver(s)? 
If we take seriously the fact that the vast majority of policies are 
purchased by primary earners on their own lives, two general 
types of household consumption theories seem most 
promising. First, one could adopt an exchange theory, under 
which the insured agrees to purchase insurance on his or her 
life in exchange for something of value from the dependents in 
the household. Such a theory has some plausible explanatory 
power insofar as the primary beneficiary of the policy is the 
insured' s spouse. However, an exchange theory would seem 
implausible, to the extent that the primary beneficiaries under 
the policy are small children. In such situations, it is difficult to 
imagine how the exchange would take place, because in most 
cases, the children will never be aware of the existence of the 
life insurance policy. In any event, by the time the children are 
in a position to offer anything of value back to the insuring 
parent, the policy often will have lapsed. In such cases, and to 
32 Obviously there can be, and often is, more than one breadwinner within a 
household. Each breadwinner can be viewed as a dependent of the other 
breadwinner, in which case each might want insurance on the other's life, even 
without children in the picture. It is also true that in households with children 
whose primary caregiver is a stay-at-home parent (or other family member who 
does not charge for the services), insurance mi$ht be demanded on the life of that 
person even if that person is not also a breadwmner. 
33 Telephone interview with Dan Kirk, insurance agent (April 2000). 
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some extent for cases involving spouse-beneficiaries, an 
altruism theory seems more appropriate. That is, the party 
purchasing the insurance chooses to do so out of feelings of 
affection for the dependent beneficiaries. Obviously, the best 
explanation is probably some combination of altruism and 
exchange.34 
II. THE CURRENT LIFE INSURANCE MARKET 
A. The Life Insurance Policy 
To evaluate the question whether households are 
purchasing adequate amounts of life insurance, we first need to 
understand a few practical aspects of the life-insurance market, 
as it currently exists.35 At the most basic level, a life insurance 
policy is a type of contract.36 The simplest form of life 
insurance contract is the term policy. Under a term policy, the 
insurance company agrees to pay a predetermined amount of 
money-called the "face amount'' or the "death benefit"-to the 
beneficiary named in the policy if the insured dies during the 
policy period, which is a period less than the insured's "whole 
life."37 In return for this promise, the insured pays periodic 
34 There is voluminous economic literature on the subject of intergenerational 
transfers. That literature explores a number of alternative modelS for explaining 
bequests (inter vivos gifts from parents to children or from IP'andparents to 
grandchildren), including altruism theories, exchange theones, and 
precautionary saving theories. For a useful and recent survey of this literature, 
see Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare 
Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 5TAN. L. REV. 641 (1999). As it turns out, no 
single theory does a good job of explaining all of the bequest-related evidence. 
Id. When children are the beneficiaries of life insurance policies, life insurance 
easily can be understood as a means by which the insured can transfer wealth (in 
this case, human capital) to the children. In such cases, the altruistic model 
seems clearly more plausible than the exchange model, because by the time the 
children are old enough to repay the parents for buying the insurance, the 
insurance typically is allowed to lapse (if it is pure term insurance). 
35 My discussion of the types of life insurance contracts draws heavily from 
KENNFI'H BLACK JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE INSURANCE (12th ed. 1994). 
36 For a discussion of the ways in which the informal aspects of the life insurance 
"relationship" between insured and insurance agent and insurer can be as 
important as the formal contractual aspects, see Tom Baker, Constructing the 
Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1994). 
37 BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 83. The" insured" is the person whose death 
triggers the payment of the death benefit to the beneficiary. ROBERT H. JERRY II, 
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW273 (2d ed. 1996). The "policy owner" is the 
person with the power to designate the beneficiary under the policy and, with 
cash value policies, the right to receive the cash surrender value. Id. This paper 
uses the terms "insured" and "policy owner" synonymously, although iliey need 
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premiums to the insurer which the insurer invests. A 
characteristic of term life insurance is that if the insured fails to 
renew or cancels his policy, the coverage will cease and any 
premiums that have been paid (and earned) will not be 
refunded. Thus, term insurance is, in one sense, temporary. 
The insured is covered only during the term of the policy 
period. When an individual purchases term life insurance, the 
contract typically provides for guaranteed renewal for a set 
number of years. Policies often provide guaranteed renewals 
up to age sixty-five or even seventy (but almost never beyond 
seventy) .38 The longer the guaranteed renewal period, the 
greater the protection for the policyholder against the 
possibility that he or she might become uninsurable, for 
example, as a result of a serious illness. That extra security, 
however, comes at a cost of higher overall premiums. The 
alternative, which is also available, is a term policy that allows 
for renewal at various points but requires proof of insurability 
at those points. Those policies are cheaper, but they leave the 
insured with the risk of becoming uninsurable. 
Standard renewable term insurance calls for premiums to 
increase each year to reflect the increased likelihood of death 
during the policy period as the members of the risk pool age.39 
Also available, however, are fixed renewable term policies that 
provide not only for a guaranteed renewal for a given period of 
time, but also for a fixed annual premium over the life of the 
policy. Given the increased risk of death associated with aging, 
fixed renewable term policies necessarily involve some degree 
of intra-insured cross-subsidization-that is, the insured pays 
higher than actuarially fair premiums in the early years, but 
lower than actuarially fair premiums in the later years.40 The 
amount of the term premium is a function of the insured' s risk 
factors (such as age, smoking status, medical history, and 
cholesterol level) and the amount of coverage purchased. In a 
competitive market, the premiums charged to a given insured 
approximate the average mortality risk of the members of the 
risk pool in which the insured is grouped. Most term policies 
not always be the same person. 
38 BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 84-85. 
39 Id. at 89. 
40 An intermediate type of policy that is often sold allows for level premiums for 
each policy period with premium increases at each renewal point (which might 
occur at five or ten year intervals, for example). See id. 
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involve increasing premiums over time and a level death 
benefit. Some, however, involve a decreasing death benefit. 
A somewhat more complex type of life insurance contract 
is the "cash value" policy. On a superficial level, a cash value 
policy looks like a term policy. The insured-investor pays a 
"premium" to an insurance company that agrees, in the event 
of the insured's death, to pay a specified amount called the 
"death benefit" to the beneficiaries listed on the policy. But the 
two types of life insurance are in fact quite different. In effect, a 
cash value policy is two products bundled together: term life 
insurance and an investment vehicle.41 Hence, when the 
insured pays the premium to the insurer, that amount is both 
insurance premium and side-fund investment.42 In other 
41 BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 177. 
42 The terminology used within the industry to describe various types of cash 
value policies can be confusing, and it can also be important. "Cash value life 
insurance" is a generic term tnat describes the category of life insurance contracts 
that provide both for a term insurance element and a savings element. The term 
that was traditionally used to describe this type of policy was "whole life 
insurance," which derived from the fact that all such policies were in theory 
designed to provide coverage for the "whole life" of the insured. Almost all 
cash value policies provide for whole life coverage. "Term life insurance," as has 
been mentioned, covers the insured only for the term of the policy period. 
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT "BOOK 5 (1 998). 
Today, because all cash value policies are designed to cover the insured-investor 
for his or her entire life, the term "whole life insurance" has come to mean a 
particular type of cash value policy-one that has fixed annual premiums, a fixed 
Cleath benefit, and whose casn value is a function of, among other things, the 
investment earnings of the insurer but whose cash value is not, technically, kept 
in a separate account on behalf of the insured. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 
ch. 5. The other major classes of cash value policies are "universal life" and 
"variable life" policies. Id. at 114, 126. What distinguishes universal life 
insurance from traditional whole life is that universal allows variation in the 
amount of premiums that are paid in each policy period and in the death benefit 
options. In addition, universal policies tenCI to provide a clearer accounting of 
tlieir internal cost-benefit structure, listing the mortality charge applied each year 
and the amount of interest credited to the insured's cash value account each year. 
Variable life policies are distinguished by the fact that the cash value of the 
policies is placed in a separate account protected from the insurers' creditors. The 
insurer, as the trustee of the insured, manages the account. The insured is 
permitted within certain limits to direct how the cash value will be invested. 
Variable life policies generally offer the insured an array of mutual fund options, 
ranging from bond hinds to aggressive growth or equity index stock funds. 
With variable life policies, the amount oI the cash value varies with the value of 
the insured's cash value account, which variations can cause changes in the 
amount of the death benefit depending on the terms of the policy. Variable life 
policies, which are the fastest growing segment of the individual life market, can 
have elements of universal policies-namely, flexible premium payments and 
adjustable death benefit options. With the development of the variable life 
policy, it is possible to replicate virtually any side fund investment approach 
within a casn value policy. See generally id. at chs. 5 & 6. 
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words, only part of the premium goes to purchase actual life 
insurance coverage. (That portion is sometimes called the 
"mortality charge" or "actuarial charge.")  The rest goes into 
some type of investment account that is held and managed on 
behalf of the insured. It is that account which is sometimes 
referred to as the policy's "inside buildup," because it grows as 
the investment earnings accumulate over time. It is also called 
the "cash surrender value," because it is the amount that can be 
withdrawn by the policyholder when she cashes in (or 
"surrenders") the policy. The death benefit on a cash value 
policy always consists of a combination of pure term insurance 
proceeds as well as return of investment.43 
B. The Regulation of Life Insurance 
All insurance companies (including life insurance 
companies) doing business in the United States are regulated at 
the state level by state Departments of Insurance, headed by 
elected or appointed Commissioners of Insurance.44 These 
state insurance regulators, among other things, monitor insurer 
solvency (both the assets and liabilities of the insurance 
companies), insurance prices (for both "reasonableness" and 
"adequacy"), policy terms, and agent conduct.45 Most of this 
43 In the early years of a policy, the insurance element is relativelt large; in the 
later years, assuming the cash value has increased (that is, none o the surrender 
value has been removed from the policy), the insurance element becomes 
increasingly small. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 130. At some point, 
assuming the insured-investor lives long enough, the cash value will equal the 
death benefit and the proceeds will be paid out. This is called the "maturity 
date." Id. at 131. 
All life insurance can be categorized either as individual or group coverage. 
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 1. Individual life insurance-whicn 
includes cash value and term insurance-typically is sold to individuals by 
agents. Id. at 3. This type of policy is sometimes called ordinary life insurance, 
afthough technically the latter term is a slightly narrower category. Id. Group 
insurance is a contract that provides life insurance to a group of individuals. A 
common example is employer-provided group insurance to all employees of the 
firm. Id. at 16. Both casfi value and term policies can be purchased as group 
coverage, although group term policies are much more common than group cash 
value policies. Id. at 16-18. Indeed, by some measures, group term life insurance 
is the most prevalent type of term life insurance coverage in the U.S. today. Id. 
44 JERRY, supra note 37, at 98. State insurance regulators, on the basis of their 
authority under the U.S. Constitution and under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
generally require any insurance company engaged in the business of selling 
insurance contracts m their state to be licensed in that state. PETER M. LENCSIS, 
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STA TES: AN OVERVIEW FOR BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT 25-26 (1997). 
45 JERRY, supra note 37, at 84-95. 
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regulation can be justified on standard consumer protection 
grounds.46 For example, the regulation of insurer solvency and 
of pricing adequacy is deemed necessary to guarantee the 
credibility of insurer promises, implicit in every insurance 
contract, that the insurer will have sufficient assets to cover the 
policyholder's claim if and when it is filed. The necessity of 
such regulation depends on the assumption that consumers, on 
their own, cannot judge adequately the credibility of insurers' 
promises to "be there" when the time comes-that is, they 
cannot judge whether the insurer will have sufficient assets to 
cover all of its liabilities. Other similar consumer protection 
stories are needed to explain statutorily mandated policy 
terms, such as incontestability clauses47 and nonforfeiture 
provisions.48 Although many insurers would provide such 
provisions in the absence of legal requirements, the fact that the 
mandates have been adopted presumes a need for consumer 
protection. In addition, various legal doctrines have 
developed, such as the doctrine of reasonable expectations, that 
also have a consumer protection underpinning. These 
doctrines protect insurance purchasers from their inability or 
unwillingness to read the fine print in their insurance policies 
and to investigate the companies thoroughly.49 
46 For a general discussion of the economic rationales for various forms of 
insurance regulation, see SETH J. CHANDLER, INSURANCE REGULATION, 
ENCYCWPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (1999). 
47 An incontestability clause provides that after a policy has been in force for two 
years, the policy's validity will become "incontestable," which means that the 
bases on which an insurer can contest coverage or decline to pay a claim are 
severely limited. JERRY, supra note 37, at 703. Such clauses have long been 
included in life insurance contracts, as a response to the fear that insurers, after 
taking the policyholder's money for all those years, would turn around and 
refuse to pay a death claim because of some technical flaw in the application 
process. Id. (datin� incontestability clauses to late nineteenth century). The idea 
behind the clauses IS that insurers nave two years to make sure that the policy is 
valid-to verify the representations made in the application, for example-and 
after that, the policyholder (that is, the householcf that will be depencfing on the 
insurance proceeds) can count on the insurance proceeds being paid if the 
insured dies. Many states have enacted statues requiring such provisions. Id. 
48 In the past, life insurance policies had no cash values, thus, when policies were 
canceled or allowed to lapse, the policyholder "forfeited" any "excess" 
contributions. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 202. Standard nonforfeiture 
laws govern how insurers must proceed in calculating and reporting their 
"nonforfeiture values" -that is, the minimum amount that a cash value 
policyholder will receive upon termination of the policy. Id. 
49 According to one leading treatise on insurance law, the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, derived from numerous court decisions, can be summarized as 
follows: 
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A somewhat different concern motivates the requirement 
in every state that a party purchasing a life insurance policy 
have an "insurable interest" in the life of the insured. The 
insurable interest doctrine, which applies to all forms of 
insurance in every state, historically has been understood to 
serve two functions: a) to discourage the use of insurance 
contracts as a form of gambling, and b) to reduce the incentive 
of policyholders to cause the event that is insured against.50 
The idea is that if the policyholder stands to lose something 
(his or her insurable interest) if the loss event occurs, then the 
purchase of an insurance policy is not really like gambling and, 
of course, the moral hazard concern is lessened. With property 
insurance, the question is whether the insured has some 
economic interest-be it a "legal interest'' or a "factual 
expectancy interest"-in the property being insured. With life 
insurance, the analysis is more subtle. First, a person is 
presumed to have an insurable interest in his or her own life. 
Second, if a party wants to take out an insurance policy on 
another person's life, that party must demonstrate either a 
substantial pecuniary interest in the life of the insured or a 
close familial tie (which is presumed to be a proxy for a 
financial interest) .51This article focuses on intra-household life 
insurance, because it is with respect to that type of life 
insurance that the theory and evidence, discussed below, 
suggest a problem of inadequate coverage. 
In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, 
insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by 
insurance contracts even though a careful examination of the policy 
provisions indicates that such expectations are contrary to the expressed 
intention of the insurer. 
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDIS.S, INSURANCE LAW (Student's ed. 1988). The 
justifications for this doctrine clearly invoke consumer protection concerns, such 
as the fact that insurance contracts are long and impossibly complicated and that 
insurer marketing practices can be misleading. Id. at 634-36. 
so Id. at 173. 
s1 Id. at 179. (statin� that " [t]he common or unifying characteristic of these two 
types of relationships is that in both there is a reason for the beneficiary of the life 
insurance to anticipate that some economic benefits either will or may result 
from the continuation of the [insured's] life .... "). In general, an individual has an 
insurable interest in all of the members of his or her nuclear family, including a 
spouse or minor child. A minor child has an insurable interest in the life of a 
parent. Id. at 181. 
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Ill. DEFENDING THE CLAIM OF LIFE-INSURANCE INADEQUACY 
A.  Empirical Research on Life-Insurance Adequacy 
By far the most sophisticated study of life-insurance 
adequacy ever completed is the most recent one, authored by 
B. Douglas Bernheim, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, the results of which have been made 
available in a working paper entitled The Adequacy of Life 
Insurance: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey.52 That 
article builds on a model of life-insurance adequacy developed 
by Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff in a series of papers 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.53 According to this approach, 
"life insurance is defined to be adequate if the survivor's 
highest sustainable standard of living after the death of a 
spouse is equal to or greater than the couple's highest 
sustainable standard of living if both survive."54 If the 
household's standard of living would decrease when a spouse 
dies, that household would be considered underinsured. 
Although this basic approach is the same as the earlier 
studies', there are two important differences: First, the 
Bernheim study examines much more recent data.55 Second, 
the Bernheim study adjusts for a number of important factors 
that prior studies did not, including liquidity constraints and 
_ changes in household composition over time (such as the 
presence of children). The authors make a number of 
assumptions to make the enterprise tractable. First, they define 
the "household" to include husbands and wives until their 
deaths and children until they reach age eighteen.56 Second, 
the authors make assumptions about the household utility 
function that allows them to predict how the death of a 
52 Bernheim et al., supra note 2. 
53 Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Life Insurance of the Elderly, supra note 2; and Auerbach & 
Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life fnsurance, supra note 2. 
54 BERNHEIM et al., supra note 2, at 6"[W]e consider the level of life insurance to be 
adequate if it allows an individual and his or her children to sustain his or her 
living standard upon the death of a spouse." Id at 2. By adopting a standard-of­
living baseline, ilie authors simply have relied on their own mtuitions as to the 
choice of a useful benchmark and have not attempted to rely on some derivation 
of the VNM utility function. 
55 Whereas the prior studies were based on data from the 1960s and 1970s, this 
� y looks as data from the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HK:;). Id. at 2. 
56 Id. at 7. 
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breadwinner will affect household consumption patterns.57 
Along the same lines, they treat certain types of expenditures­
such as housing costs, college tuition and wedding expenses 
for children, and funeral costs-as being fixed, by which they 
mean that those expenses would not be reduced or eliminated 
in the event of the death of an adult in the household.58 Finally, 
the software package the authors use employs a sophisticated 
approach to measuring Social Security benefits (including 
survivorship benefits), income and payroll taxes, and tax­
deferred retirement savings.59 
For a more detailed discussion of the study's methodology, 
data, and findings, the reader is encouraged to refer to the 
paper itself.60 This article only summarizes some of the more 
noteworthy results. The most general conclusion is that 
underinsurance is indeed widespread-for husbands and wives, 
for primary earners and secondary earners, for the relatively 
young and the relatively old, and for high income and low 
income households.61 However, the prevalence and severity of 
underinsurance does exhibit some patterns: the problem is 
much more concentrated in some areas than in others. For 
example, a higher percentage of households are underinsured 
on the husband's life rather than on the wife's life.62 The 
discrepancy in adequacy is even greater as between the lives of 
primary eamers63 and those of secondary eamers.64 Also, in 
57 Id. at 8. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Id. at 10-11. The study also leaves out a few things. For example, it does not 
attempt to take account of the possibility that a survivin� spouse will remarry. It 
justifies this assumption on the theory that "the econonnc well-being of a 
remarried individual may be deternnned by his or her financial status prior to 
remarriage, insofar as this affects bargaining power within the new marriage." 
Id. at 12 (citing Shelly Lundberg, Family Bargaining and Retirement Behavior, m 
(Herny Aaron ed.), BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND RETIREMENT POLICY (forthcoming 
1999). 
60 This paper can be found at http:/ /www.nber.org/papers/w7372. 
6t See BERNHEIM et al., supra note 2, at 24.Three categories of underinsurance were 
defined: If the death of a spouse would reduce a household's standard of living 
at all, the household was said to be merely "underinsured" with respect to that 
�ouse. If the reduction would be between 20% and 40%, the household was 
' silmificantly underinsured." And if the reduction would be greater than 40%, 
thenousehold was "severely underinsured." 
62 In terms of mere underinsurance, fifty-one percent of households were 
underinsured on the husband's life, and twenty-four percent on the wife's life. 
With res�t to severe or significant underinsurance, the numbers are thirty 
percent (for husbands) and twelve percent (for wives). Id. 
63 Fifty-five percent of households underinsured; thirty-four percent significantly 
or severely so. Id. 
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households with single earners, the underinsurance problem 
on the life of the sole earner is quite pronounced.65 One clear 
message comes from all of these numbers: underinsurance, as 
defined in this study, is alarmingly high with respect to the 
lives of primary earners.66 The authors also find that the 
prevalence and degree of underinsurance are greatest in 
relatively young households.67 Perhaps this should be 
expected, given that younger households have more human 
capital (that is, future earnings) to protect. Also, it is not 
surprising that underinsurance is most pronounced in 
households with children.68 Taking all of these results into 
account, the authors conclude that their "results point to 
widespread underinsurance."69 
Similar conclusions were reached in prior studies. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Auerbach and Kotlikoff concluded 
that a significant minority of households that were nearing or 
in retirement in the late 1960s had inadequate life insurance 
coverage. Those studies found further that almost one-half of 
households "at risk" (those for whom a substantial fraction of 
household assets will disappear with the death of the husband 
or wife) had inadequate life insurance. The authors therefore 
64 Twenty-one percent of households underinsured; eight percent severely so. 
The reason for the greater discrepancy with respect to primary and secondary 
earners is, of course, that some wives are primary earners within their 
households. Id. 
65 In such households, roughly twenty-one percent are severely underinsured, and 
another fourteen percent are significantly underinsured, on the life of the 
primary earner. Id. at 26. 
66 When the households are arranged according to income, other interesting 
patterns emerge. For example, underinsurance tends to fall as income rises at the 
lower levels of income; then it levels off (that is, underinsurance tends to remain 
constant as income rises) at moderate levels of income. Id. at 25. However, when 
it comes to significant and severe underinsurance, the tendency is the reverse. 
Both significant and severe underinsurance tend to decrease with income at low 
levels of income and to rise with income at high levels of income. Id. What 
explains this result? The authors suggest that significant and severe 
underinsurance on the lives of prima.r;y earners in the highest-earning 
households is to be expected because 'these households are more likely to have a 
single high earner, and because Social Security survivor benefits replace a much 
smaller f'iaction of income." Id. 
67 For example, in households with husbands and wives who are in their forties, 
seventy-one percent of households are underinsured, and forty-nine percent are 
significantly or severely underinsured, on primary earners. Id. at 27. 
68 In households without children present, for example, there was considerably 
less underinsurance (fifty-two percent) and significant and severe 
underinsurance (thirty-one percent) than in households with children present 
(sixty-nine percent and forty-seven percent, respectively). Id. at 28. 
69 See generally BERNHEIM, supra note 2. 
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predicted that roughly one-third of the older wives in their 
sample would have experienced twenty-five percent or greater 
reduction in their living standards had their husbands died 
during the survey year.70 They predicted greater insurance 
shortfalls for younger widows.71 They reached similar results 
in another study, this time of data compiled from surveys of a 
cross-section of U.S. households consisting of married couples 
with husbands between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-five. In 
that study they also found that a significant minority of 
households were underinsured with respect to the lives of the 
husbands.72 The underinsurance problem was most 
pronounced in the households in which women were 
considered " at risk" in the following sense: over half of the 
household's total life-contingent assets were attributable to the 
husband's life.73 
All of those findings, the authors conclude, probably 
understate the extent of the underinsurance problem for 
several reasons. First, the authors' calculations assumed no 
economies of scale in shared living arrangements.74 If such 
economies exist, if "two can live cheaper than one," then a 
larger amount of insurance would be needed to maintain a 
given standard of living. For simplicity, they assumed no such 
economies. Second, the SRI surveys included little data on 
private pension benefits.75 Because most private pensions at 
the time were defined-benefit rather than defined-contribution 
plans, and because such plans at the time typically did not offer 
joint-survivorship benefits, this omission probably caused the 
underinsurance problem to be understated. Third, Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff made no effort to take account of the 
consumption requirements of small children in the 
household.76 Adding children to the mix almost certainly 
10 Auerbach and Kotlikoff, Sample of Older Widaws, supra note 2, at 6. 
n Id. at 7. 
72 Roughly twenty-five to thirty percent of the households in the survey would 
have sitffered a reduction in standard of living of at least thirty percent, and 
fifteen percent would have suffered at least a reduction of fifty percent had the 
husbands died. Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life Insurance Purchases, supra 
note 2, at 233. 
73 In those households, twenty percent of wives would lose fifty percent or more 
of their standard of living, and forty-one percent would lose tliirly percent or 
more, if the husband were to die in the survey year. Id. at 234. 
74 Id. at 240. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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would increase the amount of coverage on a breadwinner's life 
necessary to prevent a drop in consumption power in the event 
of his or her death. Fourth, when calculating the value of each 
spouse's human capital, Auerbach and Kotlikoff assumed zero 
growth in the real rate of earnings.77 Of course, it is possible 
that real earnings could stay the same over time, or even 
decrease, but it is most likely that real earnings would increase 
with age, especially between the ages of thirty-five and fifty­
five. Thus, an assumption of zero growth would tend to 
understate the underinsurance problem.78 
In sum, all of the academic studies of life-insurance 
adequacy have concluded that life-insurance "inadequacy" is 
pervasive and in some cases severe. Additional (albeit weak) 
support for the claim of underinsurance comes from insurance­
industry lore and survey research. First, there is an industry 
rule of thumb that a "typical" household (one that includes two 
adults and two children) should have life-insurance coverage 
that equals between five and seven times its annual income. 
For whatever that rule of thumb is worth,79 industry research 
indicates that many households do not come close to meeting 
that coverage. For example, according to one study, the 
average level of coverage was roughly 2.85 times the average 
annual household income for the sample.so 
77 Id. at 228. 
78 Because the Bernheim study addresses all of these shortcomings-it accounts 
for economies of scale, it incorporates a great deal of pension information, it 
includes the presence of children, and it accounts for earnings growth-it is not 
surprising that their study finds underinsurance to be more prevalent and more 
severe than the Auerbach. and Kotlikoff studies did. Compare BERNHEIM, et al., 
supra note 2 with Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life Insurance Purchases, supra 
note 2. Another interesting finding in that particular Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
paper was that households rarely updated their coverage. Auerbach & Kotlikoff, 
supra note 2 at 3. That discovery is especially noteworthy because the survey 
was conducted during and afte�eriods of rapid inflation, when theory would 
sug est that insurance coverage which is ahriost never indexed for inflation) 
woJ1d need to be increased re arly. This failure to adjust one's coverage over 
time could be responsible for at least some of the underinsurance problem. 
'l9 Some life insurance experts contend that any life-insurance "rule of thumb" is 
basically worthless. JOSEPH BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER'S HANDBOOK (2d 
ed. 1985). The claim is that an accurate determination of life insurance need is 
too contingent on various factors that differ significantly from one individual to 
the next for any rule of thumb to be of use. Cf BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 
326-73 (showing the detailed calculations necessary to determine life insurance 
adequacy). 
80 AMERICAN COUNOL OF LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 5, at 12. 
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B. Reasons to Be Worried 
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One might be tempted to conclude that the findings of 
insurance inadequacy summarized above are, by themselves 
and with no further justification, sufficient to warrant a call for 
swift government intervention. That would be a mistake. 
Although the studies provide grounds for concern, there 
remains a considerable degree of uncertainty about how to 
interpret those results. Recall, for example, that the Bernheim 
study chose as its baseline of insurance adequacy the standard 
of living prior to the breadwinner's death.81 That is certainly a 
defensible benchmark, even an admirable one, but it clearly is 
not the only plausible one. Moreover, although the Bernheim 
study concludes that underinsurance is widespread, the 
authors nevertheless take great pains to emphasize the non­
normative nature of their study.82 They make clear that their 
definitions of "inadequacy" and "underinsurance" are not 
meant to carry any normative implication.83 For example, in 
the introduction the authors say: 
It is important to emphasize that we do not equate adequacy 
with rationality. A couple might purchase relatively little life 
insurance for a variety of economically legitimate reasons. For 
example, the household's decision maker(s) may place 
relatively little weight on the well being of the secondary 
earner, or may regard life insurance as excessively expensive. 
Thus, the current study is not intended to shed light on the 
rationality of life insurance purchases.84 
At the beginning of their "Methodology" section, they state 
that 
The adequacy of a household's life insurance is in the eyes of 
the beholder. Virtually any level of life insurance can be 
rationalized as reflecting the maximization of some 
intertemporal and state-specific preference function. 
Nevertheless, we think it possible to establish meaningful 
benchmarks and to evaluate the adequacy of insurance in 
comparison to these benchmarks. In so doing, it is important 
to emphasize that significant deviations from the benchmarks 
do not necessarily reflect irrationality. Rather, they simply 
indicate the extent to which actual choices either fall short of or 
exceed some easily interpreted target.BS 
81 BERNHEIM, et al., supra note 2, at 6. 
82 Id. at 3. 
83 Id. at 2-3. 
84 Id. at 2-3. 
85 Id. at 5-6. 
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Finally, consistent with their non-normative approach, in 
the conclusion of the paper, although the authors report 
11 widespread underinsurance," they make no policy 
recommendations.86 
Why does the Bernheim study go to such lengths to 
emphasize the non-normative nature of their enterprise 
(despite the use of the term "adequacy" throughout their 
paper)? The reason is simple: identifying definitively a single 
11 optimal" or " adequate" amount of life insurance for a given 
household is impossible. What seems odd, however, is the 
implicit assumption that such indeterminacy precludes any 
normative judgment whatsoever. Since when? For example, a 
clever scholar could come up with a model to explain virtually 
any pattern of consumption over time, even one that entailed 
almost no retirement savings. And yet countless scholars and 
policymakers operate under the assumption that some level of 
government intervention, either a tax subsidy for retirement 
savings or some form of compulsory retirement savings, is 
appropriate. 87 
The reason, of course, is that we easily can envision all 
sorts of pathologies-ranging from standard externality stories 
to myopia stories-that would lead individuals to undersave for 
retirement. A similar set of stories as well as a few additional 
ones can be offered at least as persuasively in support of 
government intervention in the life insurance market. 
1. Adverse Selection 
For starters, consider one of the most commonly offered 
justifications for social insurance regimes: the problem of 
adverse selection. In the life-insurance context, adverse 
selection occurs when some individuals are more informed 
about their own statistical life expectancy than insurers are. In 
such a situation, premiums tend to be inefficiently high, as 
insurers will be compensating for the fact that the relatively 
high-risk individuals will tend to "adversely select'' into the 
86 Id. at 35. The absence of a normative element and a policy recommendation is 
something of a departure from the earlier Auerbach and Kotlikoff studies, which 
concluded with recommendations of increased survivorship benefits. 
87 See, e.g., HARVEY s. ROSEN, PuBUC FINANCE 197 (4th ed. 1995) (" [I]t is popularly 
believed that in the absence of the Social Security program, most people would 
not accumulate enough assets to finance an adequate 1evel of consumption 
during their retirement."). 
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insurance pool. As a result, all other individuals will tend to 
purchase less than optimal life insurance coverage or perhaps 
even forego coverage altogether.BB 
2. Negative Externalities 
Next, consider how standard externality arguments might 
be applied to life insurance. The breadwinners in a household 
may anticipate that if they die leaving survivors who are 
destitute, the extended family and friends of the survivors as 
well as local charitable organizations, will step in to fill the 
breach. If so, an externality were created, which means a lower 
amount of life insurance will be purchased than would be the 
case if such informal sources of support were not available. 
This conclusion assumes of course that the extended family 
members, friends, and charitable organizations realistically 
never have an opportunity ex ante to contribute to the purchase 
of insurance on the life of the breadwinner in question, an 
assumption that seems quite plausible. 89 Likewise, 
88 See generally id. at 196-97 (summarizing the adverse selection justification of 
social insurance). For the seminal, albeit technical, article on adverse selection, 
see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 
(1976). Of course, insurance companies attempt to counteract adverse selection 
in several ways. For example, the development of employer-provided group life 
insurance may, in part, be attributable to the way that group underwriting (in 
contrast with individual underwriting) responds to the adverse-selection effect. 
Moreover, insurers have developed ways of combating the most egregious 
forms of adverse selection, even for life insurance p olicies sold to individuals. 
For example, in addition to the usual battery of medical-history questions that 
are asked of every insurance applicant, advances in medical technology such as 
new blood and urine tests help life insurers to segregate the high, medium, and 
low risk individuals into separate pools. Neither of these approaches, however, 
completely eliminates the problem. With group life insurance, there is still a 
greater tendency for high-risk individuals thari for low-risk individuals to buy 
the group term coverage at any given price. Additionally, the blood tests and 
application process for individual policies are not perfect. 
89 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and 
friends approaching an individual and suggesting that if he would increase his 
life insurance coverage they would all bear the extra cost to spare themselves the 
cost, ex post, of contributing to the support of the survivors. Of course, one 
could also argue that relying on friends and family in this way is a desired form 
of insurance rather than a type of extemality. Indeed, in one sense, reliance on 
family and friends is the original form of lffe insurance, and it may continue to be 
a type of life insurance that we want to encourage. That is, one might argue that 
society benefits-perhaps from an increased sense of community-when extended 
family and friends are expected to bear some of the load of a breadwinner's 
death. That reasoning, if persuasive, would tend to cut against the finding of 
underinsurance. However, if we take that argument seriously here, we would 
need to do so elsewhere as well. For example, on similar reasoning, we might 
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government-provided survivorship benefits tell a similar sort 
of externality story.90 That is, one could argue that 
underinsured households externalize costs to all taxpayers 
because of the payroll-tax-funded Social Security survivorship 
benefits.91 
3. Myopia or Lack of Self Control 
What about the myopia argument? In the context of 
retirement savings, it is often argued that some type of 
compulsory savings or transfer system (such as the Social 
Security system), or at least some type of government subsidy 
for retirement savings (such as IRAs and 401(k) plans), is 
justified on the theory that young individuals do not plan 
adequately for the future.92 A number of possible reasons to 
suspect such myopic savings behavior exist: (a) people may 
lack the information necessary to judge their needs in 
retirement; (b) people may be unable to make effective 
decisions about long-term issues because they are unwilling to 
confront the aging process; and (c) they simply may apply an 
inappropriately high discount rate to the future.93 These 
arguments would seem to apply with at least as much strength 
in the context of life insurance purchases: (a) households (or 
breadwinners as agents of households) really do not know 
what the households' financial needs will be in the event of a 
want to discourage retirement savings so as to encourage reliance by aging 
parents on their cltildren' s resources. 
90 Cf Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV., May 1989, at 177, 178 (describing similar extemality in context of 
health insurance); John laitner, Bequests, Gifts, and Social Security, 55 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 275 (1988) (describing similar externality, or rational free-riding myopia, in 
context of retirement savings). 
91 "Families [who purchase inadequate life insurance) may choose to rely on 
existin& government welfare programs if premature death of the family provider 
occurs. Treasury Report, infra note 176, at 40; see also Summers, supra note 90, at 
178. 
92 See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 87, at 197; CASEY B. MULLIGAN & XAVIER SALA-I­
MARTIN, Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative 
Theories, and Implications for Rejorm at 18 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 7119, May 1999) (describing "myopic prodigality" justifications of 
social security). 
93 Peter Diamond, A Framework for Social Security Analysis, 8 }. Pus. ECON. 275 
(1977). For the views of one prominent economist who is sympathetic to 
proposition (a), see Martin Fe1dstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits, 
100 Q. J. ECON 303 (1985). Of course, the argument can also run in the other 
direction-that is, that the existence of Socia[ Security discourages retirement 
savings. See generally ROSEN, supra note 87, at 205-09. 
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breadwinner's death;94 (b) individuals almost certainly are 
more averse to thinking about dying than about living long 
enough to retire;95 and (c) individuals may apply an irrationally 
high discount rate when considering the future state of the 
world in which the breadwinner might be dead. 
This last concern - of overweighing present needs over 
future ones - deserves special emphasis. It is commonly 
argued, for example, that smokers place an irrationally high 
value on the current pleasure of smoking as compared to the 
value they place on the harmful health effects that smoking will 
bring ten, twenty, or thirty years in the future.96 Indeed, 
psychological literature on this issue suggests that, where a 
substantial time gap exists between costs and benefits, 
individuals tend to use different discount rates-a higher rate 
for the distant cost or benefit and a lower rate for the more 
proximate one.97 The result is that, in the short run, the 
individual prefers the option that minimizes short-run costs or 
94 Part of the problem lies with the difficulty of determining the full value of the 
household human capital. Not only should it include the value of the insured' s 
earning capacity but it should also include the value of his or her nonmonetary 
services to the household. Both of these values are likely to be underestimated. 
Indeed, all of the various empirical studies of life-insurance adequacy have 
ignored the present value of household services. Also, even for the portion of 
numan capital attributable to future earnings, substantial underestimation is 
likely. For example, how likely is it that individuals will think to take into 
account future real pay increases when assessing life-insurance needs? Plus it 
seems almost certain that the purchasers of life insurance will underestimate the 
cost that the household will incur to hire someone to do all of the things that the 
insured used to do around the house. For example, will they know, when 
calculating the discounted present value of the insured' s future services to the 
household, to take into account that buying replacement services-childcare or 
household chores-will come out of after-tax dollars whereas the services 
themselves came out of pre-tax dollars? 
95 One of the principal difficulties that trust and estate lawyers face in dealing 
with their clients is getting them to contemplate and plan for various "end of 
life" issues. Scholars who spend most of ilieir time studying life insurance 
recognize as a serious concern people's persistent unwillingness to plan for 
death. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 338. "In many instances, individuals 
act as if they consider themselves immortal; they are psychologically unwillin� 
or unable to face their own mortality." BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 338. It 
is a matter of common knowledge to persons in the state planning field that a 
man will devote a lifetime of energy to obtain a business or an estate and spend 
no time at all or little time in arranging to pass along his estate at death." Theo P. 
Otjen & Arthur J. Pabst, Updating Life Insurance Settfement Options: A Comparison 
with Wills, 27 J. INS. 75 (1960). 
96 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex 
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L J. 1163, 1203-05 (1998). 
"' George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Clwice, 3 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 181, 183-84 (1989); see also Robert H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency 
in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1956). 
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maximizes short-run benefits (for example, forgoing the 
purchase of life insurance), but that, as the time draws closer 
for the benefit to be received (here, the insurance proceeds 
become more likely as the insured gets older), the individual's 
preferences switch. This sort of dynamic inconsistency of 
preferences-or "myopia" -is considered to be quite common,98 
and one could easily see how such a phenomenon might affect 
life insurance decisions.99 
4. Why the Market Alone Cannot Fix These Problems 
Even if there are problems of myopia initially, one might 
expect the market (namely, insurance companies) to come to 
the rescue. That is, if consumers have a tendency to 
underestimate their life insurance needs, insurance companies 
would have an incentive to educate them; and that education, 
of course, is precisely what insurance companies try to do. The 
main job of the insurance agent is to convince the customers 
that they need income replacement (or human capital) 
insurance.100 For that reason, virtually every licensed life-
98 George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse 
Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463 (1975). The whole problem of myopia, ,Put here in terms of differing discount rates, can also be expressed in terms of ' multiple 
selves" models. That is, the problem can be understood as the current self (the 
one deciding how much present consumption to forego to fund post-retirement 
consumption) not adequately taking into account the interest of the future self 
(the one who will need to live on those savings). See, ]ON EI.STER, ULYSSES AND 
THE SIRENS {1979); Thomas C. Schelling, SelfCommand in Practice, in Policy, and in 
a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1984). 
99 Purchasing life insurance requires a household to forego current income in 
order to finance a future contingent benefit. If decision-making in this context is 
similar to decision-making in other contexts, it seems plausible that the 
household will apply a higher discount rate to the future death benefit than it 
will to the current insurance premium. In addition, life insurance transactions 
for individual policies require the applicant to go through the "hassle" of the 
underwriting process, wfuch often includes giving a blood sample and a urine 
sample and sometimes going through a more thorough medical examination. It 
is unclear how much of a deterrent the life-insurance underwriting process is; 
however, given all of the other factors weighing against the purchase of life 
insurance, the process might be enough to keep many individuals from buying 
anything more than the group term insurance that is offered through their 
employers, which typically requires only that the employee sign up within a 
given period after fiist joining the company. 
100 Traditionally, this has been the primary role of the insurance agent. The 
marketing strategy of life-insurance agents in recent years, however, has shifted 
from selling human-capital insurance to selling investment products that have 
some or no life-insurance component-products such as cash value insurance and 
variable annuities. VIVIANA ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVEWPMENT 
OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 111-12 (1979) (explaining early shift in 
marketing life insurance toward emphasis on investment futures); see also GLEN 
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insurance agent has access to computer software that enables 
the agent to produce impressive and convincing "illustrations" 
of the customer's life-insurance needs. Such services have long 
been available for those individuals willing to sit down with an 
insurance agent. A more recent phenomenon is the 
proliferation of insurance-needs calculators at various web sites 
sponsored by insurance companies and others.101 If a 
consumer were to take the time to visit one of those sites and 
enter all the relevant data (such as annual income, net worth, 
number of children, and the like), she could get an estimate of 
her life insurance needs. Many of those needs calculators will 
force consumers to think through just the sorts of questions 
posed in the earlier discussion of insurance adequacy; for 
example, one common question is whether the individual 
seeking to purchase insurance on his life wants enough 
coverage to pay off the mortgage on the family house, to start a 
college fund, or to create an emergency fund. 
But even these needs calculators and agents willing to 
assess a person's life insurance needs are not enough by 
themselves; both require time and effort. If consumers are not 
inclined to give much thought to life insurance in the first 
place, it seems unlikely that many will go to the trouble to find 
a reliable insurance-needs calculator. What is more, consumers 
may be inclined to distrust any needs assessments made by 
life-insurance agents on the theory that those agents stand to 
gain (in sales commissions) by overestimating the household's 
life-insurance need. 
This last observation suggests a more pervasive problem: 
the public's distrust of life insurance agents. Although there 
was a time when the job of being a life insurance agent was 
understood (certainly within the field and to a lesser extent by 
consumers) as a noble and worthy calling, almost akin to the 
ministry,1°2 that view has since been superceded by a radically 
REYNOLDS, THE MORTALITY MERCHANTS 4 (1968) (stating that II [t]he life insurance 
industry in the United States, for its own reasons, has from its early origins de­
emphasized the actual purpose for its existence by discouraging the sale of pure 
death protection."); Id. at 177 (stating that "Pure death protection, or term 
insurance, is the outcast of the life insurance industry."). 
101 For example, consider the following insurance-need calculator articles: 
http://www.life-line.org/life/index.fi.tml; http://www.tiaa­
cre1.org/lins/howmuch:html; 
http:/ /www.worldwidewebinc.net/ family/ ca cu la tor .html. 
102 See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 100, at 119-29 (describing life insurance agents as 
being "indispensable" and akin to "salaried missionaries"). 
34 CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol 32:1 
different conception. Insurance agents have come to be viewed 
(at least by many consumers) as being more in a class with 
used car salesmen than with charity workers.103 This more 
cynical view of insurance agents has been attributed to the 
transformation of life insurance products from pure insurance 
against premature death (that is, term insurance) to a type of 
sophisticated-and for many, quite mysterious-investment. In 
fact, some critics of the insurance industry and its marketing 
tactics have laid much of the blame for the negative views of 
life insurance and of life insurance agents on the development 
of the cash value policy.104 Cash value policies are 
characterized by agents as the only form of "permanent" life 
insurance-with term insurance being given the pejorative 
"temporary" or "rented" insurance.1os The cash value policies 
are marketed so that the administrative costs, which are 
believed to be prohibitively high, are often hidden from 
consumers. Moreover, the rate of return on investments in 
cash value policies historically has been pitifully low (or at least 
that is the perception) and consumers have been less than fully 
informed (and in some cases, misled) about the nature of the 
products they are purchasing or the risks they are taking.106 
1o3 Id. at 129-47 (recounting enduring stigma that historically has attached to life 
insurance agents and characterizing fife-insurance sales as part of society's 
necessary "dirty work"). According to one insurance-industry observer, 
consumer advocate, and former state commissioner of insurance, many financial 
reporters regard the life insurance business as "legalized thievery." James H. 
Hunt, Life Cost Disclosure Prospects for True Reform, 13 J. INS. REG. 405, 422 (1995). 
104 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 100, at 5-16. According to some experts, "[b]y 
the mid-1980s the focus on many sales presentations oflife insurance seemed to 
be on life insurance as an investment," rather than on life-insurance as protection 
against the loss of human capital due to premature death. Tom Foley & Carolyn 
Jollnson, Introduction to Symposium, 13 J. INS. REG. 398, 399 (1995). "'In sales 
presentations death benefits are often almost an afterthought."' Id. (quoting an 
insurer). . 
105 REYNOLDS, suvra note 100, at 2 (explaining the difference between "permanent" 
and "temporary'' or "rented" insurance). 
10& "The business is riddled with self-dealing, unsound investments, unsuitable 
policies, high-pressure selling and unbridled sales expenses. Consumers take 
Iar�e losses when they drcp expensive coverage they shouldn't have bought and can t afford." Jane Bryant Quinn, et al., Here TlieY. Go Again, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 
1994, at 28 (citing a New York investigation of the life insurance business); see 
also Foley & Johnson, supra note 104, at 399-400. 
The quality of information being utilized in the marketing of life 
insurance has deteriorated. Some of the deterioration results from an 
increased use of gimmickry in policy illustrations and advertising. For 
example, interest rates are featured prominently, but charges made to 
the policy owner are not . . .  The quoted interest rates may relate neither 
to performance nor to any other valid basis, but may simply be picked 
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Furthermore, it seems to be no coincidence that agents who sell 
individual life insurance policies (as distinct from group 
policies) make most of their commissions from the sale of cash 
value policies.107 Notably, the commissions on cash value 
policies are easier to hide, partly due to the abundance of 
numbers contained in the policy. Compensation for 
" explaining" this complicated type of policy is easy to justify. 
5. The Dynamics of Household Consumption Decisions 
A final reason why life insurance may be suboptimally 
consumed involves the way that economic decisions are made 
within households. Traditionally, it has been assumed that 
there is joint and equal control over and consumption of 
household resources between spouses in a marriage. This 
assumption derives from the prevailing economic model of the 
household pioneered by Gary Becker. On this model, the 
household is assumed to have a single, unitary utility function; 
household resources are distributed by an altruistic head.108 
More recently, however, scholars have begun to question this 
out of the air(quoting Charles Rohm, In Vv1zose Interest, 87 VEST'S REV. 14 
(1986)). 
It is the continuing problem of life-insurance agents' use of misleading sales 
presentations that motivated the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners to adopt the Life Insurance Illustration Model Regulation in 
1995, which was intended to clarify and standardize the type of i.riformation that 
insurance agents may use in their sales presentations, called "illustrations." 
Hunt, supra note 103, at 413-14. In life insurance illustrations, typically using 
some sort of statistical software, the insurance agent "illustrates" for the potential 
customer how much her cash value will be after a given period of time under a 
�ven set of assumptions. Not surprisingly, many life-insurance purchasers 
interpret these illustrations to be guarantees of the policy's return on investment. 
For a description of the various ways in which life insurance illustrations can be 
misleading and a somewhat critical view of the Model Regulation, see Hunt, 
supra note 103, at 409-22. 
107 Although some types of cash value policies start out with relatively low agent 
commissions, over time agents gravitate toward those policies that par them the 
highest commissions. For example, following the introduction of tlie universal 
life" policy, although commissions were initially low, "[i]t did not take long 
before a Kind of reverse competition set in the highest commission, least 
consumer-oriented contract won the loyalty of agents." Hunt, supra note 103, at 
407. In more recent years, the rate of return on cash value policies has radically 
increased, in large part owing to market competition and the resulting 
development of new cash vafue products that allow investor/ insureds to invest 
in a range of mutual funds. Moreover, state regulatory innovations have 
significantly reduced (though not eliminated) the worst of the misleading 
marketing practices, so that now it is harder to hide administrative costs than it 
once was. Still, cash value policies remain significantly more complex and 
difficult to evaluate than do term policies, for reasons that are unclear. 
108 See generally GARY s. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991). 
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model and have suggested alternative models.109 Further, there 
is some evidence suggesting that household consumption 
decisions depend to some extent on whether the husband or 
the wife has the initial control over the resources. For example, 
consumption patterns appear to vary depending on the relative 
share of the household's income that is earned by each spouse. 
Studies show, for example, that "increases in the wife's income 
relative to that of the husband are associated with an increase 
in expenditures on restaurant meals, child care, and women's 
clothing, and with decreases in expenditures on alcohol and 
tobacco."110 How this dynamic might apply to life insurance 
purchases has not been studied. Still, one can tell a story along 
these lines that might help to explain part of the 
underinsurance problem. That is, for the most part, it will be 
the primary earner (usually the husband) in the household who 
ends up making the decision regarding life-insurance coverage. 
Why? Because insurance agents tend to focus their efforts on 
the primary earner; moreover, if employer-provided group 
insurance is purchased, it typically will be through the 
employer of the primary earner. In any event, the purchase of 
life-insurance coverage on the life of the primary earner may be 
a sort of household expenditure that gets neglected precisely 
because the primary earner exercises disproportionate control 
over household financial decisions. Why might this happen? 
For one thing, it might be easier for a primary earner to 
conclude that in the event of his or her death, the other spouse 
will be expected to remarry or to get a paying job or a higher 
paying job. The primary earner also could conclude that 
consumption needs will be reduced as the family will be 
expected to move to a smaller house. For now, these are just 
speculations; further empirical research is necessary to pin 
down the relationship between life-insurance adequacy and 
relative income within the household. However, there is one 
relevant finding in the Bernheim study. There, the authors 
found that the degree of underinsurance strongly correlated 
109 "What recent empirical analysis points toward is that multi-person 
households cannot be treated as single decision-makers and that household 
allocations should probably rather lie considered as the outcome of some 
interaction between household members with different preferences." Martin 
Browning et al., Income and Outcomes: A Structural Mode[ of Intrahousehold 
Allocation, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1067, 169-70 (1994). 
110 Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 
162-63 (1998) (reviewing the empirical literature on this issue). 
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with the disparity between the income of the primary earner 
and that of the secondary earner-that is, the greater the share of 
income attributable to the primary earner, the greater the 
shortfall in the insurance on the primary earner's life.111 This 
finding seems consistent with both the idea that the primary 
earner tends to exercise disproportionate control over the 
income that he or she brings into the house and the idea that 
the primary earner is inadequately altruistic with respect to the 
rest of the household's needs. 
C. Summary 
The theoretical arguments just reviewed in section B and 
the findings summarized in section A above, taken separately 
or together, do not amount to a definitive case for immediate 
implementation of some new government program designed to 
increase the level of life insurance coverage. Rather, the 
argument to this point should be sufficient to put the issue of 
life-insurance adequacy squarely on the policymaking agenda 
as well as on the agenda for future theoretical and empirical 
research. The argument should also be sufficient to prompt an 
initial, exploratory examination of possible policy responses. It 
is this latter project that will occupy the remainder of this 
article. 
IV. DESIGNING THE OPTIMAL LIFE INSURANCE SUBSIDY 
A. Brief Note on Choosing the Optimal Policy Design 
If we are persuaded that the problem of 
underconsumption of life insurance is real and significant, the 
next task is to determine the appropriate government response. 
As mentioned above, Auerbach and Kotlikoff end their initial 
studies with a sentence or two calling for either an expansion of 
Social Security survivorship benefits or an expansion of 
employer-provided group term coverage. However, any such 
recommendations are expressly rejected in the more recent 
Bernheim study.112 Therefore, no one has made any effort to 
elaborate on the policy implications of the underinsurance 
problem in the life insurance context. This Part begins to fill 
that gap in the literature. 
111 BERNHEIM et al., supra note 2, at 30-49 tbl. 13 
112 See generally BERNHEIM et. al, supra note 2. 
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Before launching into a discussion of the various 
regulatory approaches to the problem, consider first the least 
intrusive solution: disclosure. It may be that the principal 
reason people purchase insufficient life insurance is that they 
do not know how much is needed to sustain the household's 
standard of living. It may be that the market alone cannot fully 
correct this problem because, as argued above, people distrust 
the recommendations about life-insurance needs given by 
insurance agents. However, if these statements are true, the 
only policy response necessary is to develop some way of 
credibly informing households of their insurance needs should 
they want to purchase enough life insurance to maintain their 
household's standard of living. We could use a public service 
announcement, paid for with tax dollars and endorsed by some 
agency of the government, perhaps the Social Security 
Administration. It could be some joint initiative, funded by the 
life-insurance industry and certified by the government. One 
can imagine a moving television advertisement that explains 
the hardship a family can face if a primary earner dies and the 
household is inadequately insured-followed by a listing of 
websites that have insurance-needs calculators which have 
been endorsed by the federal government. 
Although such a solution might be sufficient to overcome 
the problem, this article will focus on other regulatory 
alternatives. As with the problem of insufficient retirement 
savings, it is not enough just to remind people that they may 
need to set aside more money now to provide for the future. 
Rather, the following proposed solutions are based on the 
assumption that more direct (and, alas, more expensive) 
government involvement may be needed. 
The following three categories represent a standard way of 
organizing the range of regulatory responses to the problem of 
an "underconsumed" good or service. Such a good or service 
can be provided by the government, mandated by the 
government, or subsidized by the government. Government 
provided life insurance would involve payments made directly 
by the government to the dependents after the death of the 
insured, and the source of funding would be either a payroll 
tax or income tax. (Although existing social insurance 
programs tend to be funded through payroll taxes, other 
funding regimes are possible.) With government provided 
insurance, government employees collect the revenue and 
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administer the payment of benefits. With government­
mandated life insurance, on the other hand, the basic insurance 
functions-underwriting (or risk assessment), premium 
collection, and claims adjusting-would be performed by 
private firms, but direct regulation would be introduced in the 
form of compulsory coverage. The mandate could be directed 
either at employers (as is the case, for example, with workers' 
compensation insurance at the state level) or at individuals. 
Government subsidized life insurance is a catch-all category 
used to designate all other expenditures of public funds on life 
insurance, whether as demand-side or supply-side subsidies or 
whether in the form of direct expenditures or tax 
expenditures.113 
Each of these general categories of responses-government 
provision, government mandate, and government subsidy-has 
advantages and disadvantages, which will be summarized in 
the sections that follow. It is worth noting in advance, 
however, that in this country we rarely settle for only one of 
these approaches. Instead, almost every area of the economy 
that receives public funds does so through a combination of 
approaches to public spending. Take health care, for example. 
In addition to Medicaid and Medicare, which are types of 
government-provided health insurance, there are a number of 
healthcare tax expenditures, the largest of which is the 
exclusion for employer provided medical care and health 
insurance. Likewise with education, we have a mixture of 
government provision and government subsidies: state and 
local governments directly provide public elementary and 
secondary education to virtually all children from kindergarten 
to grade twelve, and there are state-funded and state-run 
universities in all fifty states. Nevertheless, there are a number 
of government-subsidy programs primarily for higher 
education, some of which are tax expenditures (such as the 
113 There are, of course, many ways to draw the lines between these categories; 
and no particular set of defutltions is correct or incorrect-just more or less useful. 
For example, within the general cate�my of government subsidies, there is a 
subcategory known as ilie "voucher, which was given a clear and useful 
definition only recently. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & DANIEL V. SHAVIRO, THE 
ECONOMICS OF VOUCHERS 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7092, 1999) (defining a voucher as a demand-side subsidy which leaves the 
consumer with some level of choice among competing suppliers and which tends 
to display a "marginal rate of reimbursement" of the subsidized activity of one 
hundred percent up to a given point and zero percent thereafter). 
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deduction for contributions to educational charities, the 
exclusion for qualified scholarships, and the treabnent of 
education IRAs) and some of which are indirect expenditures 
(such as government guarantees for qualified student loans). 
Life insurance is no different. To the extent the problem of 
underconsumption of life insurance has been addressed 
(apparently unsuccessfully), it has been through a combination 
of government provision and government subsidies in the form 
of tax expenditures. The government-provided life insurance 
consists of Social Security survivorship benefits that are 
available to the children, spouses, and dependent parents of 
qualified individuals. The principal tax expenditure is the 
deferral (and in some cases outright exemption) of taxation on 
the invesbnent earnings inside of cash value life insurance.114 
Substantially smaller in scale are the exclusions for employer­
paid premiums on up to $50,000 of group-term life insurance 
and the various preferential tax rules for life insurance 
companies, mainly consisting of special reserve deductions not 
available to other firms.115 
The next two sections discuss the theoretical pros and cons 
of these three general approaches. Section B briefly 
summarizes the principal strengths and weaknesses of 
government-provided and government-mandated insurance 
and contrasts the two with each other. Section C provides a 
separate discussion of a government-subsidy approach. The 
focus in that section is on the use of a demand-side price 
subsidy for term life-insurance premiums-either a tax 
deduction or credit or perhaps a voucher for life-insurance 
premiums-and it highlights a few of the implementation issues 
that such a subsidy would present. Although there are a 
number of advantages to a demand-side price subsidy (when 
compared with government-provided or government­
mandated insurance), a deduction or credit should not be the 
only response. Rather, as suggested above, probably the best 
response is a combination of approaches, which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
114 In 2000, the amount spent on this tax expenditure was estimated to be $13.5 
billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2002, ch. 5 tbl. 5-1 (2001). 
115 In 1998 the amount spent on this tax expenditure was estimated to be $2 
billion. Id. 
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B. Government Provision versus Government Mandate 
41 
Both government-provided and government-mandated 
insurance have one advantage over government-subsidized 
insurance: they avoid the problem of adverse selection. As 
described in Part III.B.1.  above, adverse selection occurs when 
relatively high-risk individuals, knowing (or at least 
suspecting) that they are relatively high risk, find insurance 
prices to be a relatively good deal, and therefore tend to self 
select into insurance pools. As a result, premiums rise; low risk 
individuals buy less insurance; and the process tends to feed on 
itself, resulting in some risk-averse individuals not being able 
to purchase coverage that would have been available in the 
absence of adverse selection.116 
Adverse selection is completely eliminated, however, if the 
insurance coverage is provided or mandated by · the 
government, to the extent that individual choice regarding the 
level of coverage is eliminated. This argument often has been 
used in support of various universal health insurance 
proposals. It could be applied to life insurance as well. That is, 
if the government were provided every household that had 
dependents with (or mandated that all of those households 
buy) some set level of life insurance coverage, there would be 
little room for adverse selection, as there would be little 
opportunity for individual choice. 
But this reduction in choice is also at the heart of the 
criticisms of mandatory and government provided insurance. 
With government provided insurance, individuals or 
households would have no say in answering what might be 
considered highly personal and idiosyncratic questions: how 
much insurance is to be provided, whose life is to be insured, 
who are the beneficiaries of the insurance to be, how are the 
benefits to be paid out, how long will the coverage remain in 
force, and who will be the insurance provider. The only 
difference with mandatory insurance is that the choice among 
providers is preserved.117 Some might consider this inhibition 
116 Theoretically, insurance pools can unravel entirely, leaving everyone 
uninsured. 
117 It is possible to imagine a government-provided life insurance program that 
provides a range of options. A person mi17ht be allowed to select different levels 
of coverage, which would carry different premiums." But such a regime would 
be a dramatic departure from fhe way in wbich government has always 
provided social insurance in this country. Likewise, it is also possible to imagine 
a mandatory insurance regime that left some degree of choice regarding the 
42 CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
of individual choice a reason itself to oppose such programs 
because of the conflict with basic liberal notions of consumer 
sovereignty and individual autonomy. 
At this point, the reader understandably might ask the 
following question: was it not with respect to just those sorts of 
choices that we decided (in Part II above) that because of 
myopia and extemality concerns, households' unsubsidized 
decisions are not to be trusted? If households have a tendency 
to purchase too little life insurance coverage, to allow those 
households broad discretion in choosing their level of life 
insurance may seem unwise. Put differently, it could be 
argued that the concern for preserving individual choice in 
insurance decision-making necessarily contradicts this article's 
concern for the problem of underinsurance. That conclusion, 
however, is both true and false. It is true that, when we say 
there is a tendency to purchase "too little" life insurance, the 
amount and duration of coverage are precisely the sorts of 
consumption choices we have in mind. However, to say that 
something is underconsumed is not to say those individuals' 
preferences regarding its consumption are irrelevant. As 
emphasized throughout, determining the "right" amount of life 
insurance is extremely difficult as a conceptual matter. 
(Indeed, that was the main conclusion of Part I.) One way of 
incorporating a measure of policy-making humility with 
respect to the question would be to preserve a degree of 
consumer choice. Thus, although there may be reasons to 
encourage or even require households to purchase more life 
insurance than they otherwise would, we also want to preserve 
some element of individual or household choice in the matter. 
As to the choice between mandatory insurance and 
government-provided insurance, a sizable literature has 
developed, though none of it speaks directly to the topic of life 
insurance.118 Perhaps the best-known example is the recent 
debate over universal health care. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, there was much talk of providing health insurance 
nature of the life insurance coverage to individuals. To the extent the mandatory 
regime preserves consumer choice in that way, it would be more like the 
government subsidy regime described in the next section. 
ns For a review of the literature and an interesting and revealing application, see 
Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated cmp1oyer-Prauided 
Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation, in 5 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 
111 (1991). 
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coverage to all Americans. Among those pushing for universal 
coverage, vigorous debate existed about how to achieve that 
goal most effectively: government provision, in the form of a 
Canadian-style, single-payer regime, or government mandate, 
imposed on either employers or individuals. 
One potential benefit of mandated insurance over 
government-provided insurance is the element of competition 
among suppliers. With mandatory insurance, whether the 
mandate is imposed on employers or individuals, there 
remains some choice among suppliers. By contrast, such 
competition is believed to be especially important in the 
context of health care. With health insurance, there are 
numerous dimensions with respect to which competition can 
occur; and health insurance policies can differ significantly in 
terms of what medical expenses are covered, the degree of 
flexibility in choosing health-care providers, and so on. 
However, whether flexibility and competition among suppliers 
are as important a concern with life insurance as it is with 
health insurance is unclear. With pure term insurance, the 
policies tend to be fairly standardized, with competition being 
primarily over the price rather than the terms of coverage.119 
Another reason often given for favoring employer 
mandates over direct provision is the claim that mandates 
create "fewer distortions of economic activity" than do 
government provided benefits funded by a payroll or income 
tax.120 The best way to understand this point is to compare the 
effect of a mandate with the effect of a payroll tax on 
equilibrium wages and employment. According to standard 
economic analysis, the introduction of a payroll tax will result 
in a decrease in employment because it increases employers' 
costs, and will assume some elasticity in the labor supply. But 
this effect will be mitigated by a reduction in wages, so long as 
labor supply is not perfectly elastic. As it turns out, evidence 
suggests that labor supply, in the short run, is fairly inelastic, 
meaning a payroll tax theoretically could cause considerable 
unemployment.121 An employer mandate, on the other hand, 
119 Compare Single Payer System Picks Up Momentum If Health Care a la Canada Gains 
Grass Roots Support", USA TODAY, Thursday, April 28 (1994); with Steven 
Findlay, The Argument for an Employer Mandate 12 Bus. & HEALTH 58 (1994). 
120 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 90, at 181; Gruber & Krueger, supra note 118, at 
1 15-16. 
121 This whole analysis assumes, as is standard in public finance economics, that 
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has a different effect from a payroll tax, insofar as the 
employees place a value on the benefit being provided. 
Because they value the benefit, employees are willing to accept 
a decrease in wages in exchange. As a result, the reduction in 
employment caused by the mandate is not as severe as that 
caused by the payroll tax.122 This idea is sometimes called the 
theory of "compensating wage differentials." Under this 
theory, when employees value the mandated benefit more, 
fewer jobs will be lost as a result. On the other hand, when 
employees value the benefit less, the mandate has the effect of a 
pure payroll tax, thereby worsening the employment effects.123 
Government mandates also have some disadvantages 
when compared with government provision. First, consider a 
few of the standard criticisms that have special application to 
employer mandates. For one thing, the job-protecting effects of 
employer mandates disappear if there are wage rigidities, such 
as a binding minimum wage, that prevent wages from falling 
to compensate employers for providing the mandated 
benefit.124 Second, mandating that employers provide life 
insurance to their employees does nothing for the self­
employed or the temporarily unemployed. Thus, if universally 
provided life insurance is seen as an important goal, perhaps 
government provision (or even individual mandates) would be 
preferable to employer mandates.125 Third, to the extent 
unemployment caused by taxation is worse than reduced wages caused bv 
taxation. 
' 
122 Gruber & Krueger, supra note 118, at 113. 
123 Summers captures the point as follows: "In terms of their allocational effects 
on employment, mandated benefits represent a tax at a rate equal to the difference 
between the employer's cost of providing the benefit and the employee's 
valuation of it, not at a rate equal to the cost to the employer of providing the 
benefit." Summers, supra note 90, at 180-81 (emphasis in original). 
124 Summers, supra note 90, at 181-182. It is possible that "wage rigidities" may 
be more prevalent than proponents of employer mandates would1ead us to 
believe. Empirical research in labor economics has not been able to consistently 
document compensating wage differentials. Gruber & Kruger, supra note 1 18, at 
113. However, the prob1em may be with the nature of the data and the 
approaches taken by the researchers. In an analysis of workers' compensation 
insurance data from all fifty states, Gruber and Kruger found substantial 
evidence of both cost shifting from employers to employees and little effect on 
employment. Id. 
125 Of course, an individual mandate would apply to nonemployees as well. In 
any event, whether a government mandate is imposed on employees or on 
individuals, if the goal is universal provision, there will be a need for some 
additional subsidiiation of low-income individuals. For a recent analysis of the 
comparative distributional and efficiency effects of government-mandated 
versus government-provided health insurance, see Charles L. Ballard & John H. 
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employer mandates provide an efficiency advantage because of 
the compensating wage differentials, they inhibit the 
government's ability to accomplish redistributive goals 
through the provision of the benefit. Finally, government 
mandates tend to be more hidden from public scrutiny and 
political accountability than are other ways of funding 
universal insurance, such as taxes.126 
An individual mandate-that is, a law that compels 
individuals to purchase a given level of life insurance rather 
requiring their employers to provide it-would avoid some of 
the problems just listed, but would present problems of its 
own. For example, a truly universal mandatory insurance 
regime would require that some type of cash or tax subsidy be 
provided to low-income households. In fact, compulsory life 
insurance could not exist without some degree of government 
subsidy as well. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, 
mandatory insurance, like government-provided insurance, 
would eliminate the element of individual choice as to the 
appropriate amount of life insurance. 
Given the benefit of avoiding adverse selection, an 
argument could be made that some form of government­
mandated or government-provided life insurance would be an 
appropriate response to the insufficient demand for life 
insurance. Moreover, because we already have a fairly well 
developed system of government-provided life insurance-that 
is, the survivorship program-which would be extremely costly 
and politically impossible to replace, it is safe to assume that a 
version of the survivorship program will be preserved. With 
that in mind, the next section briefly summarizes the level of 
coverage provided under the survivorship regime. Then, the 
article turns to a discussion of how tax subsidies might be used 
to supplement that regime. 
C. Social Security Survivorship Benefits: The Current Regime of 
Government Provided Life Insurance 
Although currently we have no program of government-
Goddeeris, Financing Universal Health Care in the United States: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency and Distributional Effects, 52 NAT'L TAXJ. 31 
(1999). 
126 Indeed, it can be argued that the principal motivation behind the push for 
employer mandates in the health insurance context is not the pursuit of efficiency 
but a desire to hide the costs of healthcare reform. 
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mandated life insurance, we do have government-provided life 
insurance. The Social Security survivorship program gives a 
limited amount of coverage to the families of individuals who 
have worked and paid into the Social Security system for a 
sufficient period of time, provided that the beneficiaries meet 
certain eligibility requirements. 127 Survivorship benefits are 
part of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) Program contained in Title II of the Social Security 
Act.128 In general, spouses and dependent parents are eligible 
for survivorship benefits only if the deceased worker was 
"fully insured," which depends on how long the worker 
worked and paid into the system.129 In addition to the "fully 
insured requirement, surviving spouses who are not taking 
care of young children must meet two other requirements to 
qualify for benefits. First, they must be unmarried; and second, 
they must be either sixty years old or older, or they must be 
between fifty and fifty-nine and disabled throughout a five­
month waiting period.130 Surviving children under the age of 
eighteen, and surviving spouses who have not remarried and 
who are taking care of the breadwinner's under-age-sixteen 
children qualify for benefits even if the worker was not fully 
insured, so long as he was "currently insured," which means 
that he should have worked and paid into the system for one 
and a half years during the three years before his death.131 
Even for individuals who qualify for survivorship benefits, 
the actual payments are meager, especially for middle- and 
upper-income families. The benefits are a function of the 
deceased worker's "primary insurance amount" (PIA), which is 
the monthly benefit amount payable to the worker if he retires 
at full retirement age or becomes entitled to disability 
benefits.132 The PIA is based on the worker's average earnings 
over his or her working lifetime.133 The PIA itself replaces only 
a fraction of the insured worker's income; and the higher the 
worker's average career income, the smaller the replacement 
121 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 5. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 12. 
130 Id. at 15. 
131 There are also special rules for surviving children who are disabled. Id. 
132 Id. at 116. 
133 Id. 
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ratio.134 Thus, for a worker born in 1935 who retires in 2000 at 
full retirement age after a full-time career with steady earnings, 
the PIA would replace fifty-eight percent of his earnings if he 
were a low-wage earner (defined as earning forty-five percent 
of the Social Security average wage index), forty-three percent 
of his earnings if he were an average-wage earner (defined as 
earning the Social Security average wage index), and only 
twenty-five percent if he earned the maximum wage taxable for 
Social Security purposes (which currently is in the 
neighborhood of $63,000).135 
The relationship is somewhat arbitrary between the 
breadwinner's PIA and the survivorship benefits that 
dependents receive if the breadwinner dies. The breadwinner's 
young children136 and surviving spouses taking care of young 
children137 each receive seventy-five percent of the deceased' s 
PIA.138 However, the surviving spouse's benefit will be 
reduced if he or she earns above a certain amount139 and will be 
eliminated if he or she remarries.140 The total survivorship 
benefit payable on account of a given worker's death, however, 
is capped at between one hundred fifty percent and one 
hundred eighty percent of the worker's PIA.141 
The following example illustrates the annual survivorship 
benefits that would be received by a typical household in 
134 See id. at 26-27. 
135 Id. at 27, tbl. 1-17. 
136 To qualify for benefits, a surviving child must be under the age of eighteen 
(or, if a full-time elementary or secondary student, under the age of nineteen). Id. 
at 15. If the child is disabled before turning twenty-two, she can receive 
survivorship benefits beyond the age of eighteen. Id. 
137 Oddly, for the spouse to qualify for these benefits, the child must be under 
sixteen rather than under eighteen or nineteen, the ages that determine the limits 
of the child's benefits. Id. 
138 Id. at 26. Surviving spouses can be eligible to receive survivorship benefits 
them:-elves-an� �ot merely �s 0-e custodians of th� worker's young children-but 
only if the surv1vmg spouse is dISabled or over a given age. For example, · 
widows or widowers who are age sixty (or disabled and between fifty and fiftv­
nine) can receive benefits equal to 71 .5"% of the deceased breadwinner's PIA. fd. 
139 SOc. SEC. AoMrN., Pus. No.05-10069, SooAL SEcURITY: How WoRK AFFEcrs 
YOUR BENEFITS (1999). In general, if the surviving spouse is under the age of 
sixty-five, for every $2 he or she earns in excess of $9,600, $1 in survivorship 
benefits is lost. Id. at 1. The first $9,600 of earnings have no effect on the 
spouse's survivorship benefits. None of the spouse's earnings affects the 
surviving child's survivorship benefits. SOc. SEC. ADMIN., Pus. No.05-10084, 
S0cIAL SECURITY: SURVIVORS BENEFITS, 6 (1998). 
140 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 15. 
141 SSA, supra note 139. 
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which a breadwinner has died. Assume the hypothetical 
breadwinner worked full time and paid into the social security 
system for twenty-two years before dying in 1995 at the age of 
forty. Assume further that a spouse and two young children 
survive the deceased worker. The annual survivorship benefits 
received by the household (so long as the children were under 
the age of sixteen and assuming the surviving spouse earns no 
more than $9,600 per year and does not remarry) would have 
depended on the breadwinner's yearly income as follows: 1) H 
the breadwinner had yearly earnings equal to the federal 
minimum wage, the annual survivorship benefit would have 
been $9,912; 2) if the breadwinner had yearly earnings equal to 
the average wage (approximately $26,000), the survivorship 
benefit would have been $16,440; and 3) if the breadwinner 
had yearly earnings equal to or greater than the maximum 
wage taken into account for Social Security taxation purposes 
(approximately $63,000), the survivorship benefit would have 
been $26,304.142 These household benefits would continue to be 
paid until the children reached the relevant age limit and 
would be reduced if the surviving spouse earned above the 
$9,600 threshold or remarried. 
Whether Social Security provides the ideal government­
provided life-insurance program is open to question. First, the 
level of benefits may be inadequate. Although it makes sense 
to link the amount of benefits to the deceased worker's income, 
tying the benefits to the worker's PIA-which is based on the 
worker's lifetime average earnings, adjusted for inflation-may 
be worth reconsidering. Arguably, a more accurate measure of 
the financial value of the worker to the household would be 
some measure of the worker's income at time of death. 
Whereas the PIA seems an appropriate measure to use in 
determining a person's Social Security retirement benefit (since, 
in retirement, most individuals can expect their living expenses 
to be lower than during their younger working years), the PIA 
seems the wrong amount on which to base a life-insurance 
calculation. In cases involving relatively young families, living 
expenses will tend to increase rather than decrease, especially if 
the children expect to go to college.143 
142 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at tbL 1-10. 
143 It could be argued that the survivorship program responds to this precise 
concern by allowing special benefits for young children of deceased workers and 
for surviving spouses who are taking care of those children and by awarding a 
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Other aspects of the survivorship program involve hidden 
assumptions that are certainly defensible but deserve careful 
scrutiny. For example, the program assumes that, if a 
surviving spouse receiving survivorship benefits remarries, the 
spouse's benefits will stop.144 In addition, if the surviving 
spouse takes a job, his or her survivorship benefits can be 
reduced. These rules imply a certain austerity in the program 
that may be consistent with the majority's view of the optimal 
life insurance contract, but it may not.145 The program also 
assumes that children will be self-sufficient when they reach 
the age of eighteen, or, if full-time students, nineteen. Some 
might feel that the benefits should continue until the child 
reaches the average age of college graduation, although the 
current assumption certainly is defensible.146 And finally, that 
the current survivorship benefits are skewed to provide 
disproportionately large benefits to relatively low-income 
households seems consistent with this country's historical 
preference for progression.147 
Obviously, much more could be said about the merits and 
demerits of the current survivorship program; however, the 
purpose of this section is not to offer a systematic assessment of 
that program. Rather, the point is just to start the discussion. 
For the remainder of this article, however, the author will 
assume that some version of the current survivorship 
program-one that continues to provide a modest amount of 
income replacement for a large number of households and a 
significant amount of income replacement for the very lowest­
income households-will continue to exist. Seeing that the 
existence of this regime has not eliminated the underinsurance 
problem thus far, I will focus on possible ways of 
supplementing the survivorship program with additional 
government subsidies for life insurance. 
maximum household benefit equal to one hundred eighty percent of the 
deceased' s PIA. 
144 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 15. 
145 This also affects the surviving spouse's marginal income tax rate of the phase 
out of benefit for earnings over $9600. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
146 Recall that the same assumption-children are part of the household until a�e 
eighteen-was also made by Bernheim study. See supra note 2 and accompanymg 
text. 
147 For the same reason, the relatively regressive way in which the survivorship 
benefits are funded-through a payroll tax-is vulnerable to criticism. 
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Continuing with our assumption that life insurance tends 
to be underconsumed, this section explores the benefits and 
costs of using some sort of government subsidy to encourage 
households to purchase life insurance coverage on their 
primary earners (and perhaps on secondary earners and 
caregivers as well) . This section begins by exploring some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of government subsidies 
generally, of which tax preferences-such as special deductions, 
exclusions, and credits-are only one variety. Then this section 
offers some thoughts about several issues of implementation: 
whether the price-subsidy should take the form of a tax 
expenditure or a direct expenditure; whether, if a tax 
expenditure is chosen, a deduction or a credit makes more 
sense; and whether and to what extent the subsidy should be 
targeted to achieve optimal effect. 
1 .  The Advantages o f  Demand-Side Price Subsidies 
Most of the advantages of government subsidy can be 
inferred from what was said above in criticism of government­
provided and government-mandated insurance. The biggest 
comparative advantage of the subsidy approach (as compared 
with the government-provision or government-mandate 
approaches) is the preservation of consumer choice and 
supplier competition. How important those two factors are to 
the efficient workings of the life insurance market will 
determine whether a government-subsidy approach should be 
adopted. But first, let us be sure we understand what we mean 
by a government subsidy. For the purposes of this article, a 
government subsidy is a simple price subsidy; that is, the 
government pays part of the cost of purchasing life insurance. 
However, the individual or the household determines how 
much insurance coverage to purchase and from which 
insurance company. 
Examples of price subsidies abound. A tax preference, 
such as a deduction or credit, is a species of price subsidy. If 
the taxpayer makes a tax-preferred expenditure, the 
government shares the cost by reducing taxpayer's tax liability. 
In the case of a deduction, the price subsidy is equal to the 
taxpayer's marginal tax rate (because the deduction reduces his 
or her tax liability by the amount of the deduction times the 
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applicable marginal tax rate) . In the case of a tax credit, the 
price subsidy is equal to the credit, which typically is a given 
percentage (usually less than one hundred percent) of the 
expenditure up to some set maximum amount. Credits differ 
from deductions in that credits, unlike deductions, do not 
reduce the tax base; rather, the amount of the credit is taken 
directly out of the taxpayer's tax liability.148 Another type of 
price subsidy is the voucher, which usually reimburses one 
hundred percent of the costs of the designated good or service 
up to a set amount and no more. Food stamps are the 
quintessential example.149 A price subsidy can have both a 
substitution effect and an income effect.150 The substitution 
effect is the increase in consumption of the good caused by the 
decrease in the relative price of the good (when compared to all 
non-subsidized substitute goods) due to the subsidy. The 
income effect is the change in the level of consumption in the 
good due solely to the taxpayer's increased household income, 
owing to the subsidy. For goods called " normal goods," 
increased household income leads to increased consumption.151 
Thus, if the expenditure being subsidized is a normal good or 
service, the two effects-substitution and income-will cut in the 
same direction: toward increased consumption.152 
The price-subsidy approach has a number of potential 
advantages over direct government provision. First, consider 
one final word on behalf of " consumer choice" and "supplier 
competition." It has been a widely held view that individuals 
deciding how to invest their own resources generally are better 
cost monitors than government bureaucrats deciding how to 
invest tax dollars.153 Thus, for example, competition among 
148 In theory, by use of refundable credits or something similar, this approach can 
be applied to households that owe no taxes. In practice, refundable tax 
expenditures are relatively rare. 
149 BRADFORD & SHAVIRO, supra note 113, at 7. 
150 ROSEN, supra note 87, at 28. 
151 Id. 
152 It is the substitution effect (caused by the change in relative prices) that is 
important from the perspective of correcting the underinsurance problem, 
insofar as the problem cferives from myopia or externalities with respect to life 
insurance in particular. For a discussion of the complications that arise when the 
deduction or credit has a cap or a floor, see CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX 
POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 40-46 (1985). 
153 "The classic argument for competitive private supply, going back to Adam 
Smith's 'invisible hand,' is that the profit motive, when combined with the need 
to satisfy customers who have other options in order to get their business, is the 
best available goad to inducing both economizing behavior in production and 
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charitable organizations for tax-deductible contributions from 
individual and institutional donors may induce a more efficient 
provision of the organizations' various charitable functions 
than would, say, the competition for government grants, which 
are doled out by government employees who are spending 
only public money.154 The same could be true in the life­
insurance context. We may prefer to rely on competition 
among life insurance companies for individual customers as a 
means of inducing efficient provision of insurance benefits 
rather than to rely on the Social Security bureaucracy to do the 
job. 
A second related advantage of price subsidies over direct 
government provision is the possibility of increased efficiency 
in the following peculiar sense: if we conceive of the life­
insurance problem as an issue of distributional equity creating 
a need to move dollars from the pockets of the relatively 
wealthy (living breadwinners) and into the pockets of the 
relatively poor (dependents whose providers have recently 
died) the question becomes what is the most efficient, least 
distorted means of achieving that objective. Put differently, we 
can conceive of the life-insurance question as raising a question 
of generational equity, albeit intra-family generational equity. 
Under that conception, if a breadwinner has a price elasticity of 
demand for making transfers to his or her dependent­
beneficiaries that is greater than one (in absolute value), a 
dollar of price subsidy will induce the breadwinner to purchase 
more than a dollar of life insurance.155 So long as the elasticity 
condition holds, the government gets more bang for the buck 
by using a price subsidy than it would get by making the 
expenditure directly.156 
Price elasticities of demand have been studied extensively 
in the context of charitable contributions. The studies show 
that for middle- and upper-income individuals, the price 
socially valuable innovation." BRADFORD & SHAVIRO, supra note 113, at 46. 
154 Id. at 29. This article will argue that a supply-side tax preference is less likely 
to have this beneficial monitonng effect. 
155 CWTFELTER, supra note 152, at 60 (1985) 
l56 CWI'FELTER, supra note 152, at 281; Feldstein, supra note 93, at 303. It is also 
possible that if the government sends a dollar of direct subsidy to the beneficiary, 
the breadwinner would respond by reducing his transfer to the beneficiary by a 
dollar (or something less than a dollar). ThiS is the "crowding out" effect, and it 
can mean that the government will have to spend more than a dollar on life 
insurance to get a full dollar transferred to ilie beneficiary. 
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elasticity of demand is indeed greater than one.157 It is possible 
that the same might be true of expenditures on life insurance, 
in which case a price subsidy approach would be a "more 
efficient" means of achieving this redistributional vision of life 
insurance than would expanded survivorship benefits.158 
Given the relatively low marginal rates currently imposed on 
individual income, however, it might be necessary to provide 
either a " double" deduction or to use a relatively high credit 
percentage to achieve the same effect.159 Before this analysis is 
taken too far, however, there obviously needs to be empirical 
research done on the elasticity of intra-family giving patterns. 
Even if one believes in the general consumer-sovereignty 
and supplier-competition benefits of demand-side price 
subsidies (and perhaps the bang-for-the-buck story), there 
remain issues of program design. For example, to use Bradford 
and Shaviro's terminology, a choice has to be made regarding 
the "marginal reimbursement rate" [MRR], which is the 
"percentage of a dollar of extra expenditure for an earmarked 
commodity that the government, rather than the consumer, 
would bear."160 As the authors observe, the characteristic MRR 
for the demand-side price subsidy called a voucher is one 
hundred percent up to a point and then zero percent thereafter. 
157 See generally id, at 274 (summarizing studies, which consistently found price 
elasticities greater than one in absolute value for all but the lowest income 
groups; for 1ow-income groups, the studies were inconclusive); Charles T. 
Clotfelter & C. Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How TAXF5 AFFECT 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 403, 436 (1981) (finding highest price elasticities in higher 
income groups). 
158 It might be argued that shifting money from the pockets of rich breadwinners 
into the pockets of their slightly less rich children or spouses contradicts the 
principles of progression tliat Iead us to enact a graduated income and estate­
and-gift tax in the first place. That is a fair complaint. However, a partial 
response to the complaint would be to target the subsidy at relative1y young 
high-income housenolds, which will tend not to be the very wealthiest taxpayers. 
Sti11, it cannot be denied that this policy response will tend to benefit high­
income individuals. However, recall that we are assuming at this point that 
Social Security survivorship benefits will be dealing with the underinsurance 
problem for the low-income households. And unless we have decided that 
myopia and extemality justifications for government intervention only apply if 
the affected parties are relatively poor, then a life-insurance subsidy that tends to 
benefit individuals in the middle- and upper-income brackets needs no special 
defense, other than the sort offered in Part 11.B above. 
159 Cf. COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS, 1 RESEARCH PAPERS 4 
(1917) (proposing a 200 percent charitable contribution deduction for individuals 
with incomes less than $15,000 and a 150 percent deduction for those with 
incomes between $15,000 and $30,000). 
160 BRADFORD & SHA VIRO, supra note 113, at 29-30. 
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By contrast, the MRR for a tax deduction, one that has no floor 
or ceiling, would be equal to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate; 
and that for a credit would be equal to the credit percentage. 
Which of these structures is to be preferred will depend upon 
the justification for the subsidy in the first place. For example, 
if we believe that individuals tend to undervalue life insurance 
by twenty percent of its cost, we might provide a twenty 
percent credit or, for taxpayers with marginal rates 
approximating twenty percent, an unlimited deduction. 
Alternatively, if we thought that it was irrational for a 
household not to have at least some minimal amount of life 
insurance, we might use the voucher approach and set the 
cutoff at the desired minimum.161 
Another structural question is why the subsidy should be 
located on the demand side rather than the supply side. It is 
possible that the same benefits associated with price subsidies 
could be achieved through some sort of subsidy to life 
insurance companies rather than to life insurance purchasers. For 
example, previous versions of the Code contained what were 
considered substantial tax preferences for life insurance 
companies, mainly in the form of special reserve deductions 
not available to other firms.162 Such preferences, in a 
competitive market, would reduce the cost of life insurance to 
consumers (as compared to a world without such special 
reserve deductions), which would have the effect of 
subsidizing life insurance purchases. Notice that this approach 
too, in its idealized form, would be consistent with consumer 
sovereignty and provide for supplier competition, if we think 
those values are worth promoting. 
161 Id. at 31-32 (making these points using the example of underconsumption of 
food). Price subsidies always present a tradeoff between encouraging consumers 
to make the underconsumed expenditure (the so-called merit gooo) and s!ill 
encouraging cost consciousness on the part of consumers. Id. at 29. For example, 
it is often argued that the exclusion for employer yrovided health insurance 
blunts the taxpayers' awareness of the full costs o their healthcare consumption 
decisions and thus has contributed to the over consumption of healthcare. A 
common recommendation, therefore, is to cap the amount of the exclusion at 
some level of minimum, but decent, health insurance coverage. That 
recommendation might be a good idea; however, it should oe noted that 
considerable doubt remains as to the relationship between the tax exclusion and 
the healthcare-overspending problem. It could be argued that skyrocketing 
healthcare costs were caused more by the old fee-for-service financing structure 
than from the tax exclusion, although both may have played a role. 
162 Those preferences were apparently reduced but not eliminated by the 1984 
Deficit Reduction Act. 
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However, it is questionable whether the effect would be 
the same as a demand-side price subsidy. For example, one 
wonders whether an individual would be motivated by a cost 
reduction in life insurance stemming from a supply-side 
subsidy in the same way that he would be motivated by an 
insurance deduction, credit, or voucher. Also, as compared 
with a demand-side subsidy, a supply-side subsidy may 
involve a larger oversight role on the part of government 
agencies, which still must decide which firms get the tax 
benefit.163 Still, if it could be shown that a supply-side subsidy 
would as effective, such an approach could be used instead of 
or in combination with a premium deduction. 
2. Assorted Issues of Implementation 
Even if it is decided that a demand-side price subsidy for 
life insurance would be a useful supplement to the existing or a 
revised Social Security survivorship program, many issues of 
implementation remain to be considered. This section 
highlights a few of those issues. 
a. The Tax Expenditure Debate 
A large literature exploring the efficiency and 
distributional consequences of using tax preferences to 
accomplish social policy already exists. Much has been written 
over the years on the idea of a comprehensive tax base ("CTB"), 
as zealous supporters of the CTB have called into question the 
use of "tax expenditures"164 and anti-CTBers have questioned 
the coherence and validity of the CTB idea1;165 and I will not re­
plow all of that ground here. But a few points are worth 
emphasizing. 
I generally tend to side with the anti-CTBers (that is, the 
163 Demand-side subsidies, however, can require substantial agency oversight as 
well. For example, the Treasury Department maintains some involvement (at 
times considerable involvement) in aetermining what counts as a "charitable 
contribution." 
164 See, e.g., Stanley Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementin{Govemment 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. . REV. 705 
(1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches 
Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. 
L. REv. 352 (1970) . 
165 Boris Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 925 (1967); Boris Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the 
National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); bouglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, 
Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NoTFS 1661 (1992). 
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critics of the anti-tax-expenditure position) in two respects. 
First, I am skeptical of any suggestion that there is a "pure" tax 
base (whether it be an ideal accretion tax or an ideal 
consumption tax) that should be granted a presumption of 
superiority. Thus, I tend to agree that whether a particular tax 
expenditure provision is a good or bad idea turns not on issues 
of "correct" measurement of the tax base, but on the questions 
of efficiency and equity that are standard fare of public finance 
economists. Second, tax-expenditure critiques tend to 
exaggerate the disadvantages and understate or ignore the 
potential advantages of using tax subsidies to achieve social 
policy. For example, complaints that tax preferences increase 
the complexity of the tax laws seem to ignore the fact that some 
amount of complexity and administrative costs are inherent in 
the use of any subsidy, wherever that subsidy is located. It is 
not clear why those complexity costs are greater for tax 
expenditures than for direct expenditures. 
Another criticism often made of tax subsidies is that they 
are overbroad. According to this argument, essentially we are 
throwing money away if some individuals who receive the tax 
subsidy would have engaged in the targeted activity 
anyway.166 While this is true enough, the over breadth 
complaint can be applied to any price subsidy, whether it is in 
the tax code or not and whether it is a deduction or a credit.167 
Inevitably there is a tradeoff between a subsidy's accuracy (that 
is, the extent to which it is tailored so as to apply only to 
marginal consumers of the good or service in question) and the 
subsidy's complexity; and that tradeoff exists wherever the 
subsidy is located.168 
166 More precisely, the subsidy in such a case has the effect of a purely 
redistributive cash transfer rather than a price subsidy. 
167 See generally BRADFORD & SHA VIRO, supra note 113, at 18-24 (explaining 
circumstances in which a price subsidy-in their case, a voucher-is a cash 
equivalent transfer). ' 
168 For more of my skeptical take on tax-exceptionalism arguments, see Kyle D. 
Logue, If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Cong_ress Can: Applying Public Choice 
Theory to Tax Transitions, 67 CHI. L. REV. 1507 (2000) . Two complaints about tax 
expenditures that may have special application to the tax law arena and that 
therefore deserve close attention are the lack-of-regular-legislative-review 
concern (because they tend to be a permanent part of the Code) and the lack-of­
administrative-expertise concern (liecause the IRS is asked to administer social 
policy in realms outside of its area of competence). For a discussion of ways to 
overcome these potential J;!Oblems, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income 
Taxes: The Rehabilitation of lax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986); Edward A. 
Zelinksy, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of 
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Finally, tax-expenditure critiques almost always 
downplay, if not ignore, the potential cost savings of using tax 
laws to implement social policy. The possibility of such cost 
savings was one of the original justifications for the use of tax 
expenditure provisions as subsidies, and in some cases that 
argument still makes sense. In the case of the life insurance 
subsidy, for example, clearly there would be a cost advantage 
to using the already existing tax system and its ability to reach 
a broad group of individuals rather than creating an entirely 
new voucher system. Nevertheless, if this administrative-cost 
advantage of tax subsidies proves to be false, I would certainly 
recommend consideration of a voucher alternative. 
b. Deduction or credit ? 
If we decide to go with demand-side tax expenditure for 
life insurance, still we must decide whether to use a deduction 
or credit.169 The basic difference between the two has already 
Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 379 (199S). 
169 There is an efficiency argument that would favor using a deduction over a 
credit, and it is based on the welfarist model of altruistic giving. According to 
that model, the existence of altruism creates a type of externality that will, in the 
absence of a subsidy, mean that the altruistic purchase of life insurance always 
will always be suboptimal. As it turns out, the size of the optimal subsidy is 
inversely related to the degree of the giver's altruism. Thus, the more altruistic 
the giver is, the smaller the subsidy sliould be; likewise, a less altruistic giver 
needs a larger subsidy, relatively speaking. At the limit, the least altruistic 
givers-those who experience a little increase in utility because someone else's 
utility is increased-should get a subsidy that approaches the value of the gift 
itself. Although this may seem counterintuitive to the non-welfarist, it actually 
makes sense within the welfarist model when we remember that less altruistic 
givers by definition give less weight to the beneficiary's utility than do more 
altruistic givers; therefore, the former need more encouragement to give than do 
the latter. Kaflow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 970. An interesting policy 
implication o this analysis is that a high-income individual who makes a gift 
that is equal to that of a low-income individual should receive a greater subsidy 
because of the former's relative lack of altruism (as evidenced by the size of their 
gifts relative to their incomes). There are a number of possible objections that 
could be raised to this model from outside of the welfarist perspective. For one 
example, it could be argued that altruism itself is a praiseworthy characteristic 
and that larger degrees of altruism are more praiseworthy than smaller degrees 
of altruism, such that the welfare-maximizing subsidy-which offers rewards in 
just the opposite way:--would be perverse in the extreme. Kaplow anticipates the 
IJOSsibility of such objections. Id. at 971 n.12. That is precisely what a deduction 
does. In a system of progressive tax rates, if two taxpayers have deductible 
expenses of equal size, tfie deduction will be more valuable to the high-bracket 
taxpayer than to the low-bracket taxpayer. Thus, at least on efficiency grounds, a 
deduction may be preferable to a credit, which does not have those 
characteristics. Id. at 476. 
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been mentioned. The value of a deduction to the household is 
a function of the household's marginal tax rate; whereas the 
value of a credit is a function of whatever credit percentage 
Congress sets when it enacts the credit. As a result, tax 
expenditures in the form of deductions are often criticized as 
being distributionally unfair because they disproportionately 
benefit households with relatively high incomes-households 
that, in our system of progressive tax rates, will be subject to 
the relatively high marginal tax rates. The argument is that if 
tax expenditure is to be used, a credit is the superior approach 
from the perspective of distributive justice. This argument has 
been made, for example, in connection with the charitable 
contribution deduction. Some commentators have complained 
that the charitable deduction, because it is more valuable to 
higher-bracket taxpayers, disproportionately benefits the 
charities preferred by high-income individuals.17° Others 
contend, however, that the force of that objection depends on 
who tends to benefit from the charities in question. For 
example, it has been argued that the charities preferred by 
high-bracket taxpayers tend to provide more in the way of 
public goods to society than the charities preferred by lower­
income donors. High-income taxpayers tend to give more to 
educational institutions and hospitals, whereas, low-income 
taxpayers tend to give more to religious organizations. The 
argument is that educational institutions and hospitals provide 
more public goods per dollar received than religious 
organizations, which are primarily devoted to serving the 
interests of their donors. Thus, it has been argued that even if 
switching from a charitable deduction to a charitable credit 
could be designed to maintain the same overall level of 
charitable giving, such a change likely would substantially alter 
the distribution of gifts-a big increase for religious institutions 
at the expense of educational institutions and hospitals.171 
Whether or not this defense of the charitable deduction is 
persuasive, it seems unlikely to move anyone as a defense of a 
life-insurance subsidy that disproportionately benefits the 
170 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 362 (1980); CLOTFELTER, supra note 152, at 103-04. 
171 Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I - Aggregate 
and Distributional Effects, 28 NAT'L TAXJ. 81 (1975); Martin Feldstein, The Income 
Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II - The Impact on Religious, Educational, and 
Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX }. 209 (1975). 
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households of high-income families. 
In sum, unless an argument can be made that a price 
subsidy skewed in favor of high-income families 1s 
appropriate, a credit would seem superior to a deduction on 
fairness grounds. Therefore, the only possible argument in 
favor of the deduction would be that a different approach to 
the problem is being used for low-income households-namely, 
government-provided survivorship benefits. These benefits 
replace a much larger fraction of income for the lowest-income 
households as compared with the highest-income households. 
And the choice of direct government provision for low-income 
households with a deduction-price-subsidy for higher income 
households might be justified on the 'bang-for-the-buck' price­
elasticity theory mentioned earlier. The best way of achieving 
intra-family generational equity in a relatively high-income 
household might be the use of a deduction, because relatively 
high-income individuals tend to have the higher price 
elasticities of giving.172 The best way of achieving intra-family 
generational equity within relatively low-income households 
therefore might be government provided survivorship 
benefits.173 
c. Accuracy vs. Complexity 
Finally, there is the lingering question of fine-tuning-that 
is, whether it would be worthwhile to target the subsidy by, for 
example, varying the amount of available deduction or credit 
on the basis of the number of dependents living in, and/ or the 
net worth of, each household. For example, on the theory that 
net worth tends to rise with age for most people (and thus-all 
else equal-life insurance need tends to diminish), we might 
172 Another response to the distributional concern raised by the use of a 
deduction would be to increase marginal tax rates on upper-income households. 
The rate increase would not only respond to distributional concerns raised by the 
new deduction but would actually enhance the deduction's desired substitution 
effect. Of course, raising marginal rates would also exacerbate other undesired 
substitution effects, which would have to be weighed in the balance. 
173 Of course, with really low-income households, it is not so much intra-family 
generational equity that concerns us, but rather inter-family equity. That is why 
we have the progressive income-tax rate structure in the first place. Therefore, if 
survivorship benefits are to be retained as the principal means of dealing with 
the underinsurance problem in low-income households, we need to rethink the 
fundin� mechanism. Currently, survivorship benefits are funded by a highly 
regressive payroll tax. We should consider changing the system so that tfte 
revenue source for survivorship benefits is collected in a more progressive 
manner. 
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allow a one hundred percent premium deduction for 
households in which the primary taxpayer is twenty-five years 
or younger and then phase the deduction out gradually until it 
is eliminated for taxpayers who are forty-five or fifty-five or 
whatever age is chosen.174 Similarly, the percentage of 
premium that is deductible could be linked to the number of 
dependents within the household: the more children or other 
dependents living within the household, the greater the 
insurance deduction. Some households-maybe single-person 
households with no dependents or households with net worth 
above a certain amount-would be entitled to no insurance 
deduction whatever. The precise details of such a rule, and 
whether extensive fine-tuning would be worth the cost, are 
beyond the scope of the current analysis. 
E. Existing Tax Subsidies for Life Insurance 
The analysis of this Part has led to the conclusion that, in 
response to the problem of inadequate life-insurance coverage 
in this country, some form of demand-side tax subsidy may be 
a desirable supplement to the existing social security 
survivorship program. The issue to which I now turn is the 
extent to which the existing demand-side tax expenditures for 
life insurance-the exclusion for employer provided insurance 
and the treatment of cash value life insurance-serve this 
function. In one sense, the obvious answer is no, given that the 
existing empirical research indicates substantial 
underinsurance notwithstanding the existence of the existing 
tax subsidies. Therefore, one general recommendation, which 
will be expanded upon in the subsections that follow, would be 
to make these tax subsidies more generous than they currently 
are. 
1.  The Exclusion for $50,000 of Employer-Provided Coverage 
That suggestion would apply perhaps least controversially 
to the existing income tax exclusion for employer-provided 
group term coverage. That exclusion, which applies to the 
174 It is possible that a one hundred percent premium deduction might not be a 
sufficiently generous starting point for the phasedown. For example, depending 
on the elasticity of demand for life insurance, it might be that a one hundred fiffy 
percent or two hundred percent deduction would be the appropriate starting 
point. See supra discussion of double-deduction proposal in charitable giving the 
context. 
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premiums paid by an employer on behalf of an employee to 
purchase up to $50,000 of group term coverage on the 
employee's life, represents a clear (albeit small) step in the 
general direction suggested by the analysis of this Part. 
Inherent in the exclusion, of course, are implicit assumptions 
along the lines described above in subsection A of this Part. 
Except for the fact that we are using an exclusion (which ties 
the subsidy's MRR to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, which in 
turn is tied to income level), we have chosen not to fine-tune 
the subsidy to target the households most likely to be 
underinsured. In addition, we have capped the subsidy 
arbitrarily at $50,000 of coverage, presumably not because we 
think that all employees tend to underconsume life insurance 
by precisely the amount of $50,000, but because $50,000 is a 
nice round number that fits within the existing revenue 
constraints at the time of enactment. A reform of this rule, 
which the analysis of this article suggests, would be to expand 
the existing exclusion to cover employer-provided group term 
coverage up to an amount that roughly equals the amount by 
which most households tend to underinsure. Again, this is 
where additional theoretical and empirical work is needed. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, consider the following 
proposal: provide an exclusion for employer-provided group 
term life insurance coverage up to five, seven, or ten times the 
employee's annual income. Then choose one of those annual­
income multiples and apply the same rule to everyone, or have 
different multiples apply to employees in different 
circumstances-with relatively high multiples applying to 
younger employees and low multiples applying to older ones. 
Some employers already offer such life-insurance options as 
benefits to their employees, and many employees take full 
advantage of the provision, maxing out the amount of 
employer-provided coverage, even though only the first 
$50,000 of coverage is tax-free. But many employers do not; 
and where such plans are offered, many employees fail to take 
maximal advantage of them. Increasing the amount subject to 
the exclusion, along the lines just described, might be enough 
to encourage the desired level of insurance. Whether such a 
change would be worth the cost in terms of tax revenue is 
precisely the sort of question that requires further 
investigation. 
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2. The Tax Treatment of Cash Value Life Insurance 
[Vol. 32:1 
The other primary tax expenditure for life insurance that can 
be found in current law, which again is much larger in magnitude 
than the group-term-insurance exclusion just discussed, is the set 
of rules governing the tax treatment of cash value life insurance. 
The following summary captures the gist of those rules. 175 If an 
individual purchases a cash value life insurance policy (which is a 
contract that combines pure term life insurance and an investment 
vehicle into one product), the accrued earnings in the investment 
side of the policy-sometimes called the "inside buildup"-are not 
taxed unless and until the policy is partially or wholly surrendered. 
And even then, those investment earnings get preferential 
treatment. For example, upon surrender of the policy, gains are 
taxed only to the extent they exceed the "total policy costs," which 
includes the actuarial costs and the loading charges. Also, the 
taxpayer is allowed to recover these costs on a first-in/first-out 
basis. What is more, given the availability of policy loans (under 
which insureds can borrow part or all of the inside buildup without 
causing a realization event) and the exclusion for life insurance 
proceeds paid out upon the death of the insured, it is possible for 
cash value policyholders virtually to eliminate rather than just 
defer taxation on investment earnings accumulated inside a cash 
value insurance policy. 
These rules create an obvious tax preference for cash value 
life insurance products. More precisely, they create a preference 
for combining one's  life insurance and one's investments into a 
single "bundled" product rather than separating or "unbundling" 
those transactions though an approach that is sometimes referred to 
as the "buy term and invest the rest" (BTIR). If an insured­
investor uses the unbundled approach, the earnings on the 
investments may not get the same tax-favored treatment as they 
would inside a cash value policy. Thus, for those taxpayers who 
have the resources and the desire to insure and invest, the cash 
value rules can be understood as subsidizing the decisions both to 
insure one's  life and to save for future consumption, so long as the 
two are done together. Indeed, these two policy objectives-the 
need to encourage the purchase of life insurance and the need to 
175 For summaries of the cash value rules, see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, TAX 
PouCY: TAX TREATMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ACCRUED INTEREST, 
(1990) [hereinafter GAO Report]; and Andrew D. Pike, Reflections on the Meaning 
of Life: An Analysis of Section 7702 and the Taxation of Cash Value Life Insurance, 42 
fAX L. REV. 491 (1998). 
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encourage long-term savings-are offered as the only plausible 
justification for the cash value rules by everyone who has written 
on the subject, critics as well as defenders. 
These rules have been the subject of several extremely critical 
studies.176 All of those studies implicitly or explicitly agree with 
the assumption that the principal justification for the cash value 
rules is the problem of underinsurance. However, each of the 
studies either explicitly concludes or strongly implies that the cash 
value rules should be repealed altogether. The main reason given 
for that conclusion is that the cash value rules primarily, and 
unjustifiably, benefit high-income individuals. These studies also 
recommend that, at the very least, the tax treatment of inside 
buildup should be amended to be more consistent with the current 
tax treatment of other types of long-term investing. Thus, with that 
goal in mind, two recommendations are commonly made: 1) policy 
loans should give rise to taxation of inside buildup with perhaps a 
penalty tax to boot (as is currently done with other tax-favored 
retirement accounts); and 2) the first-in/first-out basis-recovery 
rule for cash surrenders (to be contrasted with loans) should be 
repealed and replaced with a rule similar to the one that applies to 
annuities or stocks, where basis recovery is less "accelerated." 
I am no fan of the cash value rules. They are among the most 
complicated provisions in the tax code, and they do not seem to 
have made much of a dent in the underinsurance problem. Indeed, 
despite all of the tax advantages provided to those who adopt the 
bundled approach, the BTIR approach still dominates the 
market. 1 77 Moreover, there is little doubt that the cash value rules 
do not create an ideal response to the underinsurance problem. 
Any version of the deduction, exclusion, or credit proposals 
mentioned in the previous sections of this Part would probably be a 
better approach, if for no other reason than their relative simplicity. 
Nevertheless, if those rules are to be retained as the principal 
existing tax subsidy for life insurance (as seems likely to happen), 
176 See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 175; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRFSS ON THE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY PRODUCTS, (1990) 
[hereinafter Treasury Report); See also Pike, supra note 175. The influence of the 
Pike article can be seen throughout both the GAO Report and the Treasury 
Report. 
177 Cash-value policies represented 66.3 percent and term policies 33.6 percent of 
the total new policies sola in 1997. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE 
INSURANCE FACT BOOK7 (1998). When the statistic is "life insurance in force" 
rather than new policies issued, term insurance still dominates both in terms of 
policies issued and face amounts of coverage. Id. at 8. 
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consider the following tentative observations. 
First, a case can be made that, contrary to the conclusions of 
previous studies, the cash value rules should be made more 
generous to taxpayers, not less. 178 Those studies have emphasized 
the ways that the cash value rules tend to favor savings that are 
bundled within a cash value policy, thus creating a "distortion" in 
favor of doing one's savings through the bundled approach rather 
than any number of BTIR approaches. However, that is precisely 
the point of the bundled subsidy. It is the nature of such a subsidy 
that the after-tax return to savings in the bundled form will 
outperform the savings in the unbundled form. Otherwise, there is 
no subsidy. Because many other tax expenditure �rovisions exist 
that favor savings outside of cash value policies, 79 perhaps the 
cash value rules should be made more generous. 180 
Second, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the cash value 
subsidy is the conventional wisdom among financial advisors that 
it is a "bad buy," and that the unbundled approach is generally 
better. What is the source of the negative views of cash value 
insurance? It stems from beliefs about how cash value insurance 
works in the real world. The claim is that, although cash value 
insurance may be a great deal in theory, in reality the tax benefits 
of most policies are more than outweighed by hidden 
administrative costs. 1 8 1  However, this claim presents a further 
puzzle: given that cash value insurance is, in theory, nothing more 
than two separate financial products-life insurance and 
178 Previous studies have universally called for cutting back on the tax 
advantages provided in the cash value rules. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 
175, at 3 and Pike, supra note 175, at 525-35. 
179 To take one example, consider the income tax treatment of state supervised 
pre-paid tuition plans. See I.RC. 529. Under those plans, taxpayers can invest for 
their children's college education in a highly tax-favored manner, without 
having to buy any life insurance whatsoever. See generally www.tiaa­
cref.org/tuition/index.tlml (explaining 529 college savings plans; The 529 
Solution, MONEY MAGAZINE, May 2001. The availability of that option, however, 
along with all the other tax-favored ways of investing, undermines the value of 
the cash value subsidy, because the value of that subsidy is directly related to the 
after-tax opportunity cost of the funds. 
1so For example, the various reforms enacted in the 1980s designed to reduce the 
amount of investment earnings that can be sheltered inside a cash value policy 
could be repealed or at least revised. For a summary of those rules, see Treasury 
Report, supra note 175. 
1s1 This view has some weak support in the scholarl): insurance literature. 
Antony C. Cherin & Robert C. Hutchins, The Rate oj �eturn on Universal Life 
Insurance, 55 J. RisK & INS. 691 (1988); Richard B. Corbett & Jack M. Nelson, A 
Comparison of Term Insurance Rates to Protection-Related Charges in Universal Life 
Insurance, 59 J. RISK & INS. 470 (1992). 
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investment-bundled together, why would the administrative costs 
be higher for the bundled approach than for the unbundled 
approach? Why would the difference in administrative costs be 
large enough to offset the tax advantages of the .bundled approach? 
If cash value insurance is, in fact, merely a bundled version of 
BTIR, then in a competitive market, how could such large 
differences in administrative costs persist? Why would they not be 
competed away? Presumably, in a competitive market they would, 
but therein lies the problem. The failure of cash value insurance to 
clearly dominate its BTIR alternatives, to the extent explicable by 
the higher administrative costs and loading charges associated with 
the former, is partial evidence that the cash value market may be 
less than fully competitive. This should be a concern-again, only 
if the cash value subsidy is to be retained. 
CONCLUSION 
Why is the problem of underconsumption of life insurance 
studied so little? The problems of inadequate private savings, 
especially retirement savings, and inadequate health insurance 
coverage have been the subject of countless studies and legislative 
proposals. By contrast, the findings of the relatively few studies of 
life-insurance adequacy that many households are significantly 
underinsured have gone largely unnoticed by policymakers and 
subsequent scholars. Why is that? Granted, the magnitude of the 
life-insurance problem may be small in comparison with the 
problem of inadequate retirement savings. Most households that 
own term insurance policies never collect on those policies. This 
is because most breadwinners live long enough that the household 
becomes largely independent of the breadwinner's  human capital, 
and the policies are allowed to lapse. Children grow up and move 
out on their own, and families eventually accumulate sufficient 
non-life-contingent assets-household savings plus Social S ecurity 
entitlements-to provide for the financial needs of surviving 
spouses. After all, premature death is a rare event by definition; so 
we should not expect it to be a "front burner" issue for most people 
most of the time. 
Still, the level of underinsurance documented in the Bernheim 
study discussed in Part II is not trivial. If underinsurance were 
truly as "widespread" as it suggest, one would expect more public 
concern about the question. Perhaps it will come as the study gets 
play in the academic community, but that is doubtful. As reflected 
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in Part I, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about the central 
assumption on which all of the existing empirical studies have 
been based: that the optimal or correct amount of life insurance 
entails an amount of coverage necessary to leave the dependent 
with the same consumption power he or she had when the 
breadwinner was alive. Even if we could agree on that 
assumption, there would remain the equally difficult and equally 
important question of what constitutes "maintaining the household 
standard of living." 
Consider, for example, the response I received upon asking a 
friend how much life insurance a household should buy: "Enough 
so that the breadwinner's  dependents would not be left destitute, 
but probably no more than that." A number of others to whom I 
have put this question have expressed similar opinions. One 
colleague even went so far as to suggest that he wanted to arrange 
his affairs so that when he died his family would actually be a little 
worse off financially as a result, so that they would be sure to 
experience regret. In other words, he did not want them dancing 
on his grave. The life insurance decision is a complex one, no 
doubt. The living-standard-maintenance baseline may not be for 
everyone, even if it can be given some content in particular 
contexts. However, my concern is that the impossibility of 
identifying a single correct formula for determining life-insurance 
adequacy will serve to justify a lack of introspection and a lack of 
intra-household communication, such as between spouses, and on a 
regular basis, about what the household's  actual life insurance 
needs are, problems that easily can be made worse by the sort of 
market failures (for lack of a better term) described in Part II.B 
above. 
With this concern in mind, consider one other anecdote that 
arises out of my research for this article. In getting comments on 
earlier drafts, the initial reaction, especially from colleagues with 
economics or business backgrounds, has often been decisive and 
adamant: I have gotten this all wrong-exactly backwards, in fact. 
The life insurance market is one that should be expected to work 
especially well. Life insurance contracts are quite simple and easy 
to understand-at least that is the case with term insurance 
policies. Therefore, consumers should have no difficulty 
understanding and evaluating the various alternatives. In addition, 
the market seems especially competitive, given the price wars 
being waged over the Internet. Moreover, the laundry list of 
market-failure rationales described in part II.B.  (adverse selection, 
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externalities, myopia, and intra-household agency problems) just 
do not ring true. Ironically, however, a few of those same critics 
have come back to me and, without backing down one bit from 
their assessment of the paper, have confessed that, upon reflection 
(and after discussion of the matter with their spouses), it occurs to 
them that personally they are in fact woefully underinsured, a fact 
that they admit had not occurred to them until after they had read 
this article. Therefore, even if this article does not lead to policy 
changes of the sort described in Part III, perhaps it will help to 
encourage more careful assessments of household insurance needs 
among its audience by prompting a discussion of the life insurance 
adequacy question. 

